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Abstract
Over  the past decade,  regional integration  has become  the evolution of regional institutions  such as  the Asia-
the  focus of intense global interest and debate,  and the  Pacific  Economic cooperation  and the Association  of
regionalization  of East Asia has figured prominently  in  Southeast Asian Nations,  among others. The authors
that dialogue.  East Asia can  be described  as a  focus on trade, direct investment,  and the financial and
heterogeneous  region that is both global  and  monetary  aspects of regional cooperation.  In their
intraregional.  Sakakibara  and Yamakawa  examine the  analysis,  they compare other regions, particularly  the
motivating factors  and underlying  dynamics of the  European Union and the North American  Free Trade
progression  toward closer  cooperation  in the region  Agreement.  Finally, the authors  suggest cooperative steps
beginning  from  a historical perspective,  which sets the  the  region  might take over the next decade to promote
stage for an evaluation  of the form that regional  the growth and stability of its member economies.  In this
cooperation  might take so as not to sacrifice  the benefits  regard,  they look at the future role of regional
of the region's already  achieved openness.  This  institutions,  the ptospects  for a regional role in
examination  includes a review of the lingering  effects of  promoting trade and foreign direct investment,  and the
the 1997-98  Asian  crisis,  the expanding role  of China  in  possibilities  for financial and monetary cooperation.
the region, the  prolonged  slump in Japan's economy, and
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The purpose of this study is to evaluate the pattern and gauge the progress of
regional iiitegration in East Asia from a political-economic  viewpoint.  The focus is on
the trade, investment,  and financial/monetary aspects of regional cooperation in
projecting a viable framework for integration in the coming decade and assessing the
prospects  for its success in bringing prosperity to East Asia.  The study examines the
causal factors of regionalism  in East Asia and the underlying  dynamics of the movement.
In this process, differences between Asia's type of regionalism and that of other regions
of the world, in particular Europe and North America,  will become apparent.
The extent of the region's heterogeneity  is revealed and its implications  for
regionalism  evaluated.  The region's economic and financial diversity has particular
implications for the formation of regional institutions in East Asia.  The evolution of such
institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) are examined from the perspective of their objectives and
achievements  in an effort  to assess their contribution to the development of regionalism
in East Asia.  That examination will determine whether the economic  cooperation they
promote has brought the desired benefits to their individual members and to the region as
a whole.
An analysis is made of the patterns of East Asia's trade  and foreign direct
investment (FDI) from a global/intraregional  perspective, taking into consideration the
importance of trade and FDI interlinkages.  In this context, we will determine what, if
any,  role regionalism  can play in the promotion of these two types of transactions,  which
are so essential to the growth and development  of the region.
We evaluate the ramifications of the East Asian Crisis in the context of
motivating factors for intraregional cooperation.  Arising out of this crisis were some
initiatives, e.g., the Chiang  Mai Initiative of bilateral swap arrangements,  that have
intensified financial  integration in the region.  The study examines  this aspect of the crisis
and assesses the potential effectiveness  of such initiatives in deterring another financial
crisis in the region.
Other areas of concern  that have arisen from the crisis are capital account
liberalization and financial  structure reform.  In the case of the former, our discussion
focuses on possible approaches to capital account liberalization that mniniize its inherent
risk.  The latter, financial  structure reform, is addressed from the perspective of a bank-
based system versus a market-based  system and how the region might progress from the
former to the latter in the attempt to develop a sound and stable financial sector capable
not only of forestalling another crisis, but also of promoting economic growth in the
region.  The alternatives of a national, regional and international approach  to attaining
this goal are presented.
The issue of monetary integration and exchange rate regimes for East Asia has
been vigorously debated throughout  the region, and even the world, but with no real
consensus reached so far.  This study presents the current arguments for and against the
various regimes,  including fixed, floating,  and the intermediate regimes that fall between
those  two corner solutions.  While the region may not yet be ready for an EU-type
currency union,  some type of foreign exchange policy coordination would be a pragmatic
and feasible starting point for eventual full monetary integration.Overall, the study assesses the progress that has been made in East Asian
cooperation and suggests some possibilities for the future that would use regionalism to
advantage  in plotting steps for growth over the next decade.  In particular,  it will consider
the future of regional institutions,  the prospects for a regional role in promoting trade and
FDI, and the possibilities  for monetary and financial cooperation.
The paper is divided into two parts.  Part One, "History and Institutions," sets the
stage for the above discussion and includes Chapters  I through III.  Chapter I is a
historical review of the development of trade in Asia from the pre-modem  era.  This
review encompasses  a wider area than just East Asia since the origins of trade in the
region extended from China and Japan west to India and south to Southeast Asia.  It is
revealed that Asia's trade was at the same time intraregional  and global, emphasizing the
openness  and prominence of the region even at that time.  The role of precious metals,
used as "money" in this trade, further reinforces this image.
Chapter II examines the heterogeneity and degree of openness of East Asia today.
This is accomplished through a review of current economic and social indicators, which
provide an overview of the region in terms of economic  size and development.  These
reveal the high level of diversity among the nations within East Asia, particularly in
comparison with other regions of the world.  Other indicators show the degree to which
East Asia remains open today and how well it is integrated into the global economy.
Chapter III looks at regionalism in East Asia from the perspective of the region's
institutions or fora.  Regional institutions have been slow to develop in East Asia and in
fact are still evolving.  Institution building has not played the prominent role in East Asia
that it has in Europe.  As cooperation  among nations of the region becomes more of a
-priority, attention is increasingly focused on what type of institutions would best serve
the interests of the region as a whole and of the individual countries therein.  There are
currently several institutions comprising different groupings of countries, which represent
the region.  The most prominent of these are ASEAN (and ASEAN-Plus-Three)  and
APEC.  This chapter examines the rationale for their formation, objectives and
achievements.
Part Two of the study, "Trade,  Finance and Integration," includes Chapters  IV
through VII.  A description of these chapters  is included in the "Introduction to Part
Two".  Please note that Chapter VI includes the summary and conclusions for the entire
study (Parts One and Two) and Chapter VII presents  future prospects  for East Asian
regionalism.
ivChapter  I - Asia:  A Historical Perspective
In assessing the appropriate integrative  strategy for any region striving to promote
economic development., it is essential to look not only at relationships as they currently
exist, but also as they existed historically.  John Maynard Keynes advised economists  to
"examine the present in.  light of the past, for the purposes of the future."  Angus
Maddison goes a step ffirther to suggest that the past  to be examined should cover periods
prior to the  l9th and 20th centuries (which is the period usually covered by quantitative
research in economic history) even though earlier periods "involve the use of weaker
evidence, and a greater reliance on clues and conjecture  [ . .] because differences in the
pace and pattern of change in major parts of the world economy have deep roots in the
past."'
A review of economic history will show that Asia has been an open region fully
involved in the world economic  system as far back as pre-modern times.  Even when
China and Japan, during the  15th and  17th centuries,  respectively, ostensibly closed their
borders to outsiders and external trade, evidence  shows that the closure was not complete.
It is clear that, over time, Asia had an instrumental  role in the global division of labor and
its conduct in the world  economy was open and outreaching.
Historians have in recent years come to regard the world economy from other
than a Eurocentric point of view.  The Asia of previous centuries  is now being recognized
as not just a part of the globe discovered and opened up by Europeans but rather as
having had an economic system of its own prior to their arrival.  In fact, this system may
have contributed  as much to Europe's economic growth as Europe did to Asia's growth.
Abu-Lughod (1989) focuses  on the period between 1250 and  1350 as the time
when "an international trade economy was developing that stretched all the way from
northwestern Europe to China;  it involved merchants and producers in an extensive
(worldwide) if narrow network of exchange."2 Frank (1998)  claims there has existed a
"single global world economy with a worldwide division of labor and multilateral trade
from 1500 onward."3 He emphasizes the preponderant position of Asia in the world
economy and system "not only in population and production,  but also in  productivity,
competitiveness,  trade, in a word, capital formation until  1750 or 1800."
Braudel (1984)  describes the Far East as the "greatest  of all the world-
economies". 5 Although he speaks of the Far East between the 1  5t  and 18th centuries  as a
single world-economy,  he says it in fact comprised three "gigantic  world-economies:
Islam, overlooking the Indian Ocean from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and
controlling the deserts stretching  across Asia from Arabia to China; India, whose
influence extended throughout the Indian Ocean, both east and west of Cape Comorin;
and China, at once a great territorial power - striking deep into the heart of Asia - and a
maritime force, controlling the seas and countries bordering the Pacific."6
Braudel describes the relationship  among these areas  as "intermittent" since it was
the result of a "series of pendulum movements  of greater or lesser strength,  either side of
the centrally positioned  Indian subcontinent."  These pendulum swings sometimes
benefited the East (China) and other times the West (Islam) "redistributing  functions,
power and political or economic advance,"  or sometimes ceased altogether leaving Asia
divided into "autonomous  fragments".'  This type of situation exists even today as
evidenced by the variety of regional institutions, such as APEC, ASEAN, ASEAN PlusThree, and others, that comprise different groupings of Asian and Pacific nations in an
attempt to find one that works best economically  and politically for the region.
Emergent  from the historical economic  literature is a picture of a gradually
expanding world economy that included not only trade but also the institutions and
systems that supported it.  Of considerable  significance in this world system and, from
some perspectives the central focus of it, is Asia.  While many of the territories,
countries, nation-states  and cities that make up Asia have changed over time, this region's
importance  in, and contribution to, the world economy cannot be denied.  This chapter
will show that throughout history Asia has functioned not only as an integrated region but
also as an active and, sometimes  leading, participant in the global economy.
Size of the Asian Economy
One indication of the prominence  of a country within a region, or a region within
the world, is the size of its economy.  The size of the global economy historically, and
Asia's position therein,  is reflected in the population and GDP statistics.8 Population
growth and share for periods between  1000 and 1800 are compared for Europe and Asia
in the tables below using data from three sources; i.e., Bennett (1954), Clark (1977) and
Maddison (2001).  (See Tables H.2 through H.5 in Historical Appendix for details of
population levels, growth rates, and shares as estimated by the three historians.)9
Table 1.1
Comparative  Population Growth
1000-1500  1500-1600
Region  Bennett  Clark  Maddison  Bennett  Clark  Maddison
Euopef  64.3%  74.4%  121.9%  29.0%  22.1%  28.1%
All Asi7  51.2%  30.5%  55.2%  15.0%  31.2%  33.4%
China  78.6%  66.7%  74.6%  12.0%  50.0%  55.3%
India  12.5%  12.9%  46.7%  25.9%  26.6%  22.7%k
Japan  300.0%  60.0%  105.3%  25.0%  12.5%  20.1%
Wodd  62.2%  52.5%  63.2%  9.0%  16.6%  27.0%
1600-1700  1700-1800
Region  Bennett  Clark  Maddison  Bennett  Clark  Maddison'
Europe  29.2%  27.7%  10.7%  63.5%  63.2%  68.6%
Al Asia  37.7%  38.6%  6.2%  52.2%  40.5%  76.8%
China  46.4%  0.0%  -13.8%  68.3%  110.0%  176.1%
India  47.1%  100.0%  22.2%  57.0%  -5.0%  26.7%
Japan  35.0%  44.4%  45.9%  3.7%  0. %  14.8%
Wodd  27.0%  28.7%  8.6%  48.9%  38.8%  72.5%
' Growth  rate covers 1700-1820 for Maddison.
2 Includes both Eastern  and Western  Europe.
3 Includes East, West and South Asia
Source: Compiled from Maddison  (2001), Frank (1998), Bennett  (1954),  and Clark (1977)
2In Table  1.1 above, there are obvious differences in growth rate estimates among
the three sources; however, there is consistency in some time periods and certain trends
are apparent.  The estimates of all three sources show Europe's population growing
considerably faster than that of Asia from 1000 to  1500.  In the next two centuries (16th
and  17th),  the growth rate worldwide slows considerably - most likely due to epidemics
of infectious disease (primarily bubonic plague), war and urbanization.  During this time,
the difference  between the two regions'  growth rates narrows but for Europe the
slowdown is greater so that Asia's growth exceeds that of Europe (according to two of
the three sources).  In the  1 8th century, Asia's growth rate jumps to between 40 percent
and 77 percent, but only Maddison shows a faster rate for Asia than for Europe.
Table  1.2
Comparative Populatlon Share of World Total
1000  1500  1600
Radlon  6;ndtt|  Clark:|  Meddlson  Bennett  Clark  |  Maddlon  Bennett  Clark  IMaddbon
Eurq;e?  15%  14%  12%  15%  16%  16%  18%  17%  1s
Al Asia  61%  63%  68%  57%  54%  65%  60%  61%  66f
Chhia  25S  21%  22%  28%  23%  24S  29%  30%  29
India  179%  25%  28%  12%  19S%  25%  14%  20%  24
Japan  1%  4%  3%  4%  4%  2%  4%  4%  3%
Wcdd  100%  100%  100%  100%9  100%  100%O  100%  100%  100%
1700  1800
Rion  SeBennet  Clark  Maddlson  Bennrtt  Clark  Maddbeon'
Eurape  19%  17%  17%  20%  19%  16%
Al Asia  65%  6f%  67%  67%  66%J  68%
China  33%  23%  23%  38%  35%  37%
India  16%  31%  27%  17%  21%7  20%
Japan  4%  4%  5%9  3  3%  3
WaId  100%S  100%9  1001%  100%  100%  100%
Gtovlh rate coim 1700-182D for Maddison
klk-d  both  Eastern and Western  Eurpe
Indides Ed, West and Sotth Asia.
Sagia  td  frn  Maddisan (2001)  Frank (1998), Bennett  (1954), and Clark (1977)
Asia's share of world population far exceeded that of Europe in all time periods.
(See Table  1.2.)  The esitimates  for population  share from the three sources (Bennett,
Clark and Maddison)  are much more consistent than those for population growth.'0
Asia's share of world population in the year  1000 was already four to five times
greater than that of Europe so that although faster growth in later periods allowed Europe
to increase  its proportion, Asia retained the predominant  share.  In fact, Asia's population
share has remained above 50 percent for 2,000 years and was, by most estimates,
between 60 and 70 percent up to the end of the 19th century.
The major proportion of Asia's population has been located in China and India,
which historically have had a combined 70 to 85 percent of the total population of Asia,
or 40 to 60 percent of  the world's population. "  1 The speed of population growth in Asia
is thus strongly affectedl by growth in these two countries,  and secondarily by growth in
Japan and Indonesia.  For example,  according to Maddison's estimates in Table H. I
(Historical Appendix),  in the  18th century, East Asia's phenomenal  80 percent rise in
population was led by China's increase of 176 percent.  Similarly, in the following
3century (1820-70), the considerably smaller increase of 7 percent for East Asia reflects a
decline of 6 percent in China's already large population partially offset by increases  in
the smaller populations  of India, Indonesia,  and Japan.
The significance of a region's population gains perspective when its relationship
to economic development is considered.  Maddison (2001) points to two possible causes
of the accelerated population growth in the last millennium:  increased fertility and
reduced mortality, with the latter, in his opinion, being predominant.  While
acknowledging  that increases  in life expectation are not captured  in GDP measures, he
has found there  to be "significant  congruence,  over time and between regions,  in the
patterns of improvement  in per capita income and life expectation."12 Improved
economic development generally leads to longer life expectation, which in turn leads to
increased population size.1 3
Frank (1998) is of the opinion that despite the lack of production and income
estimates for the period he covers  (1400-1800),  "it stands to reason that this much faster
population growth in Asia can have been possible  only if its production also grew faster
to support its population growth."'1 4 He cites the literature of other economic historians,
including Ho Ping-ti (1959), Gilbert Rozman (1981), Immanuel Wallerstein (1989), and
others, as confirmation that "Asia and various of its regional economies were far more
productive and competitive  and had far and away more weight and influence in the global
economy than any or all of the 'West' put together until at least  1800." 15  He goes on to
say that this was made possible in part because of Asia's technology and economic
institutions.  Although hard data for this period is difficult to obtain, he supports his
argument by referring to GNP estimates  for at least the end of the period (1750-1800)  as




(in 1960 US dollars and  prices)
Total (billio  ns of dollars)  Per cap ita (dollars)
Third  Developed  Third  Developed
Year  World'  countries2  World'  countries2
1750  112  35  188  182
1800  137  47  188  198
1830  150  67  183  237
1860  159  118  174  324
1900  184  297  175  540
1913  217  430  192  662
1928  252  568  194  782
1938  293  678  202  856
1950  338  889  214  1,180
Beiroch uses the term "Third World"  and includes Asia and other countries currently
referred to as 'developing  countries-.
2 Includes  Europe,  America, Japan and other industrialized countries of today.
Source: Compiled from Bairoch (1993: Table 8.2, p.  95)
According  to the figures  in the above table, from the mid- 18th century through the
mid- 19th century total t5NP was considerably higher (roughly one and a half to three
times higher) in "Thircl World" countries (including Asia) than in developed countries.  A
reversal of this pattern began to occur around 1900 and is attributed to the long-term
effects of the Industrial Revolution, which after a century and a half resulted in a
"multiplication by more than five of the average standard of living" in developed
countries. 1 8
Bairoch's estimate of total GNP in 1750 was $147 billion (in 1960 U.S. dollars),
of which 76 percent was in "Third World" countries while only 24 percent was in
developed countries.  By 1860, these proportions had dropped to 57 percent for "Third
World" countries and 43 percent for developed countries out of a total $277 billion of
GNP.
However, given the large population of Asia relative to that of Europe, per capita
GNP follows a different pattern.  While Bairoch estimates that per capita GNP in 1750 is
also greater  for "Third World" countries ($188) than for developed countries ($182), this
does not continue and is reversed over the next 50 years so that by 1800 developed
countries'  GNP per capita exceeded (by $ 10) that of "Third World" countries,  for which
the level remained the same ($188).  His estimate  for China alone, however, is $210,
which exceeds that of both developed and "Third World" countries. 19
By the end of the colonial period in 1950, the per capita income of "Third World"
countries had reached only $214 while that of developed countries was 51/2 times greater.
Braudel (1984) points to Bairoch's calculations  as indicative that despite Europe's
"dazzling triumphs all, over the globe," its level of wealth was far from superior to that of
the rest of the world.  He supports this statement by referring to Bairoch's total GNP
figures in Table  1.3, which shows that it was not until the late  19th century that the
developed countries overtook the rest of the world in total GNP.2 0
5While Maddison's (2001)  GDP estimates  are not directly comparable to those of
Bairoch (because of differences in regional  grouping and currency measurement),  there
are some consistencies between the two.  (See Tables H.6 through H.9 in the Historical
Appendix.)  Table H.6 reveals that total GDP for Asia exceeded that for Western Europe
in the periods up to the late  1gth century - being two to four times greater in the periods
between  1500 and 1820.  This divergence is even more apparent in Table H.8, which
shows Asia's share of world GDP at a remarkable  70 percent in the year 1000 versus
about 9 percent for Western Europe.  As Asia's share declines  gradually to 59 percent in
1820 with a further drop to 38 percent over the next 50 years (to 1870), Europe's share
increases at a slow, steady pace to reach 33.6 percent by that year.  By 1913, however,
Europe overtakes  Asia and maintains that lead until the late 20t1h century.
Maddison's estimates of per capita GDP follow a different trajectory from those
of Bairoch.  His estimates in Table H.9 show that from 1500 onward, Europe's per capita
GDP surpassed that of Asia.  In the year 1000, per capita GDP was nearly the same for
both regions (I$40021  for Europe and I$449 for Asia).  By 1870, that for Europe had risen
fivefold, whereas that for Asia had increased only 23 percent.  The gap only becomes
greater throughout the 20th century with Europe's GDP per capita reaching a level five
times that of Asia by the end of the century (based on Maddison's 1990 international
Geary-Khamis  dollars).
Maddison estimates that China's per capita GDP exceeded that of Europe from
the 5h to the  14th centuries22 (see Table  1.4 below) after which China (along with most of
the rest of Asia) remained more or less stagnant in per capita terms until the second half
of the 20th century.  He credits the higher levels of income  in the earlier periods to
China's "technical  precocity and meritocratic  bureaucracy"23 and attributes the stagnation
in Asia initially to "indigenous  institutions and policy, reinforced by colonial exploitation
which derived from Western hegemony and was most marked from the eighteenth
century onwards."24
Table 1.4
"Guesstimated"  Level of Chinese  and European  GDP Per Capita,  50-1700 AD
(1990 $)
Year
50  960  1280  1700
China  450  4501  600  600
Europe'  450  400  500  870
a  Excluding Turkey and  USSR
Source: Maddison (1998: Table  1.3, 25)
Based on Maddison's  data, Japan was an exception as it did not experience this
stagnation.  Japan's per capita GDP remained lower than that of Asia as a whole until the
early 19th century.  Maddison believes that income levels in Japan were probably
depressed in  1500 because  of civil war but estimates a substantial increase in
performance in certain sectors of the economy from 1600 to 1820.  His estimate is that
Japanese GDP per capita rose by a third from  1500 to  1820 and, thus, caught up with and
surpassed that of China and most of the rest of Asia by the early 19th century.  He
6attributes this to the Meiji takeover in  1868, which involved massive institutional change
with the goal of catching  up with the West.25
Frank (1998) also finds that Japan's economic development was not stagnant
from the second half of the 17'h century through the 18th century.  Despite stabilization of
population growth, agricultural and other production continued to grow causing per
capita income to increase during the 18'h century.2 6
Maddison's findings reveal an Asia that has maintained throughout history the
largest share of the world's population,  and of world GDP (absolute value) until the 20k"
century, but that has been considerably less productive and worse off than Western
Europe on a per capita basis  since  1500.  He claims his view is consistent with the
mainstream view, which is reflected  in Landes (1969, p.  13-14).  Maddison labels
Bairoch's (1981) view of China being well ahead of Western Europe (and the rest of Asia
only 5 percent lower), as a "highly improbable scenario [that] was never documented in
the case of Asia [...  ],  27
While he goes on to acknowledge that Bairoch has been influential, he rejects
Bairoch's assessment that colonial exploitation was largely responsible for the slow
development of the "Third World".  Maddison agrees with Landes (1969) who states,
"Western  Europe was already rich before the Industrial Revolution [...].  This wealth was
the product of centuries of slow accumulation, based in turn on investment, the
appropriation  of extra-E,uropean  resources and labour, and substantial technological
progress, not only in the production of material goods, but in the organisation and
financing of their exchange and distribution [...] it seems clear that over the near-
millennium from the year  1000 to the eighteenth century,  income per head rose
appreciably - perhaps tripled."28 Maddison supports his view by referring to the
"laborious  efforts" he has made "to accumulate quantitative  evidence on this topic."  He
claims that by rejecting the view of Bairoch he does not deny the role of colonial
exploitation, but makes it better understood "by taking a more realistic view of Western
strength and Asian weakness around 1800."29
In the final analysis, it is difficult to reach a high level of certainty as to who is
correct in his assessment  of economic development during this period, particularly in
view of the lack of reliable data available (freely acknowledged  by all) that makes
estimates or, in the worst case "guesstimates", necessary for the earlier periods.  There
are also allegations of E,urocentrism, Asiacentrism and Sinophilia that are alleged by one
or another to have prejudiced  the findings presented  in much of the previous  literature.
Keeping this in mind, the best that can be concluded at this stage is that Asia did
have the major share of world population,  as well as world GDP in absolute amounts
throughout most of the previous millennium.  Furthermore, Asia most likely had higher
per capita income than did Europe in the pre-modern  era (or prior to about 1500) and
possibly even up to  1800 (depending upon whose estimates are used).  It is generally
agreed that the Industrial Revolution in Europe and European colonization of Asia had
decidedly negative consequences  for Asian economic development in the 19th and 20h
centuries.  While Europe's technological  superiority rapidly accelerated  during this
period, there is plenty of evidence that Asia was not lacking in this respect, particularly
prior to  1500.30  At the very least it can be said that historically Asia's share of the world
economy was of such magnitude as to render it impossible to dismiss as irrelevant.  In
7fact Asia had large resources of primary materials  and a significant technological base
from which to produce goods that were highly desired in Europe.
Asia's Historical Place in the Trading World
Trade between Asia and Europe began over 2,000 years ago (5,000 according to
some) and increased after the  16'h century with the establishment of direct maritime
contact.31 More precisely, the opening of the direct sea route around the Cape of Good
Hope led to the integration of global trade generally between  1500 and 1800 with the
Portuguese pioneering direct European maritime trade with Asia.32 In the 16th century
the Portuguese were a dominant presence in Euro-Asian trade.  Their position, however,
was successfully challenged in the  1  7th and  1  8 th centuries by other Europeans, particularly
the Dutch and the English who founded joint-stock companies  specifically to trade with
Asia (i.e., the Dutch Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) and the English East
India Company (EIC).)  The shift in dominant European presence in Asia among these
three countries from the 16'h through the 18'h centuries  is demonstrated in Table 1.5.
Table  1.5
Number of Ships Sailing to Asia from Seven European Countries,  1500-1800
1500-99'  1600-1700  1701-1800
Portugal  705  371  196
Netherlands  65  1,770  2,950
England  811  1,865
France  155  1,300
Otherb  54  350
Total  770  3,161  6,661
'1 590s for the Netherlands
b'Other' refers to ships of the Danish, Swedish trading companies, and the Ostend Company (Austria).
Source: Maddison (2001: Table 2-6, 63) sourced originally from: Portugal  1500-1800 from MagalhAes Godinho
in Bruin and Gaastra (1  993:7 and 17); otherwise from Bruijn and Gaastra (1993:178 and 183).
While the English expanded their presence between the 17th and  18th centuries, the
Dutch retained the largest maritime presence among Europeans in both centuries.  The
presence of the Portuguese declined to almost nothing in the 18th century.
From 1400 to 1800, Asia-related trade can be conceptually divided into two
spheres:  intra-Asian and global.  The intra-Asian trading sphere can be further divided
into two overlapping regions: the Indian Ocean region (encompassing the Middle East,
Central Asia, India,  and Southeast Asia) and the Asian region (encompassing  Central
Asia, India, and East Asia).33 During the period under discussion, goods produced and
traded by Asia included a wide variety of luxuries and commodities, with some of the
most prominent being pepper, spices, sugar, silk and cotton textiles, rice, wheat, sugar,
coffee, opium, precious stones, medicines, weapons,  and horses.  Another commodity
that played a key role in Asia-related  trade was precious metals (especially silver).
8Intra-Asian  or "Country" Trade
Intra-Asian trade (also called "country" trade)  was initially conducted by Asians
with Asians.  This trade developed long before Europeans  arrived in Asia and, in the
beginning,  the ships and their owners, the merchants and the goods traded were all Asian.
The nature of intra-Asiarn  trade changed over the centuries.  By 1500, there already
existed "an old and wide network of maritime trade routes in Asia: routes between ports
in East and Southeast Asia; routes between Malacca and ports on the coasts of India; and
routes between India and ports in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf [. .."34  When the
Europeans arrived in Asia, they became heavily involved in the country trade
(particularly the Dutch) End influenced the way it was conducted.  Nonetheless,  intra-
Asian trade involving exclusively Asians remained a large portion of this type of trade.
Europeans engaged in intra-Asian trade to "procure cargoes for the European
market"  and "to accumulate profit [...] for their King, for their company - and for
themselves as private individuals."  5 Among the European trading companies, the Dutch
Voc3 6 were the most active in intra-Asian trade.  Towards the end of the  17th century and
beginning of the  18th century, the VOC was carrying more (in volume and value) between
Asian ports than all other Europeans (trading companies and private traders)  combined.37
The VOC started to participate in intra-Asian trade around the same time it began its
Euro-Asian trade and before long, the VOC's intra-Asian trade rivaled its trade between
Europe and Asia.  Although the VOC's intra-Asian trade began to decline in the 18th
century, this trade remained an integral part of the VOC's overall trading  strategy until it
ended operation at the end of the  18th century.38
The VOC's intra-Asian trade involved a complex pattern of multilateral trade.
Femme Gaastra (1999) describes the VOC's intra-Asian trade "as a 'fan' with Batavia
[present-day Jakarta] as the 'grip'  [. ..]."39  According to Prakash (1999), the most
important links in this pattern in the early 1630s included investing European precious
metals, Japanese silver (obtained against Chinese silk), and Taiwan gold (obtained
against Japanese silver and Indonesian pepper) in Indian textiles, which were exchanged
for Indonesian pepper and other spices.  Some of the textiles, and the bulk of the pepper
and spices, were exported  to Europe.  Textiles were also sent to various Asian factories
and some pepper and spices were used for investment in India, Persia, Taiwan and Japan.
In this way, new links were forged among the various Asian markets and between the
markets of Asia and Europe.40
Although trade was conducted under the direction of Europeans and goods were
carried in European ships, in fact large numbers of Asians assisted with and were directly
and indirectly involved.  Braudel (1984) describes how thousands of local people manned
the ships, served in the armies, and operated as merchants and bankers in the commercial
centers.  There were also ships owned and run by Asians that flew the Portuguese flag in
order to benefit from lower customs duties accorded Portugal in certain ports.4 '
Another connection between the Europeans  and local people was through
marriage.  Before the arrival of the Europeans, there already existed many prominent
Asian trading families whose activities were essentially run by the women of the
family.42 The Portuguese were the first to intermarry with these women, doing so to
establish profitable colonies.  Later, the Dutch married the daughters of these earlier
unions instead of importing Dutch women who were reluctant to live in the Far East
9because of living conditions there.  These unions benefited not only the Dutch in their
intra-trade  operations but also the local families.43
Steensgaard (1991), in discussing the pattern of Asian trade routes, refers to
"increasing evidence  of the viability of Asian merchant entrepreneurs  and the practical
partnership  established by European powers and Asian merchants; partnerships explained
by the fact that both sides still found more profit in co-operating than in fighting each
other.""4
While there was indeed a strong partnership  aspect to intra-Asian trade, there
were also many ways in which the Europeans and Asians remained separate and
competitive.  Gaastra (1999), in his study of intra-Asian trade in the 17'h century,
determined that there was more competition  than collaboration between the Dutch VOC
and Indian merchants.  Chaudhury and Morineau  ,1999) acknowledge  that most
historians characterize  the pre-colonial period (1 6'  to  18th centuries) as the 'Age of
Partnership'45 but they believe there to have been more competition than collaboration
between the European trading companies and Asian merchants  during this period.
Competition  from Asian merchants was sufficiently strong to prevent the Europeans from
driving the Asians out of trade in the area, except in the few cases where military and
political power was applied (e.g., in the Moluccas,  and Bantam).  Van Leur (1955)
emphasized  that in the 16th century the maritime trade conducted by Asians had
continued to be of vital importance.  Most historians in recent years question the
dominance of the Europeans in the Indian Ocean up to the mid- 1  8'h century emphasizing
their limited role and marginal activities.46
While the Asian-only portion of intra-Asian trade was quite large and Asian
merchants  were respectable  competitors, European involvement did over time have a
significant impact on this intraregional trade.  Feldbek (1991)  describes certain aspects
of this impact as follows.47
*  European settlements  were established and thrived in South and Southeast Asia,
e.g., Manila (Spain), Batavia (Netherlands), Pondicherry and Port Louis (France),
and Bombay, Madras and Calcutta (Britain).  By the end of the 18th century, these
had developed into major commercial centers with extensive economic  and
financial interests.
*  The Europeans promoted the development of their ports by attempting to "force"
intra-Asian trade (by military, political  and economic means) to become centered
in these locations, particularly Portuguese Boa and Malacca, Dutch Batavia and
English Madras.
*  They opened up new routes and introduced new types of goods.  For example,
they exported large amounts of opium from English Calcutta to southern China.
Akita (1999) looks at intra-Asian trade in the late  19th and early 20'h centuries and
cites several Japanese economic historians48 who claim "the economic growth of Asian
countries was led by intra-Asian trade, which had long historical origins but which began
to grow rapidly around the turn of  the century."49
Sugihara (1990)  argues that the economic success of Japan in the  1980s,  as well
as that of the NIEs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) in the late  1  980s,
originated in their pre-war intra-Asian trade where they developed skills in what she calls
"culture neutralizing the Western commodity mix".  By this she means neutralizing
10Western cultural elements to suit Asian domestic markets;  e.g., making things "smaller
and cheaper" or "neater and cleaner".50
Table  1.6 below shows Sugihara's estimates of the geographical distribution of
Asian trade (including India, Southeast Asia, China and Japan) between  1883  and  1928.
Table  1.6
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According to these estimates, the listed countries'  exports to and imports from the
West between  1883  and 1928 increased by 4.3 percent and 5.4 percent, respectively.
Intra-Asian trade between those years, however,  experienced  a greater rise of 11.2
percent (for exports) and  13.7 percent (for imports).  This resulted in a jump in share of
intra-Asian exports from 24 to 41 percent and imports from 28 to 44 percent, a significant
rise over the 45-year period.  Among the countries listed, the greatest increases in share
of intra-Asian exports were  for China (33  %) and Japan (35  %).  For imports, the largest
increases were for India (19 %) and Japan (24 pp).  Southeast Asia's intra-Asian export
share increased by 11  percentage points while its import share dropped by 1 percentage
point.
Sugihara (1985) points to the development of the modern cotton industry as key
to the growth of intra-Asian trade because it promoted the cotton trade on many levels
eventually leading to the emergence  of an "Asian inter-regional  division of labour with
Japan and India as exporters of manufactured  goods and importers of primary products
on the one hand, and China and Southeast Asia as exporters of primary products and
importers of manufactured goods on the other."51  This pattern is shown in the breakdown
of Japan's trade statistics in Table  1.7 below.
11Table  1.752
Japanese  Trade with  other Asian Countries
1892  1902  1912  1925  1935
£000  Share  £000  Share  £000  Share  £000  Share  £000  Share
Exports  _
Prmary Products  1,518  46%  3,701  33%  7,992  26%  20,186  18%  18,208  16%
Manufactured  Goods:  1,550  47%  7,115  64%  21,638  71%  86,706  75%  91,288  81 %
Textiles  211  3,631  13,560  57.791  45,354
Other  Light Industrial Goods  559  2,118  4,471  _  13,8981  13,861
Heavy Industrial Goods  780  1.366  3,607  13.017  32.093
Total  3,270  100l  11,051  100I  30,527  100l . 115,240  100%  113,170  100O
Imports
Primary Products:  3,940  89%  11,660  94%  31.031  94%  138,636  95%  81.220  89%
Food  2,144  4,300  12,773  63,619  36,725
Raw Material for Textiles  1,600  6,265  14,376  52,591  19,558
Other  Raw Material  196  1,095  X  3,882  22,426  24,937
Manufactured Goods  480  11%  669  5Y  1,579  5%  6,666  5%  9,764  11%
Total  4,435  100Y  12,418  100Y4  32,887  100Y  146,184  100%-  91,710  100G
Source: Sugihara (1990: Table  3,133); Yukizawa  Kenzo and  Maeda Shozo,  Nihon Boekino Choki Tokei (Japanese  Trade
Statistics Reaggregated  by Commodity and  by Basic and  Major Region).  Kyoto, Dohosha,  1978.
Notes: Total  includes special category trade.  Foreign Exchange  Rate see Yamazawa  Ippei and  Yamamoto  Yozo,
Boekito  KokusaiShoji (Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments), LETS Vol.  14, Tokyo, ToyoKeizai Shimposha,  1979.
Table  1.6 shows that Japan's trade in the early 1880s was primarily with the West,
which was the case for other Asian countries as well.  In Japan's case, this trade consisted
of exports to the West of primary products and semi-manufactured  goods and imports of
manufactured goods from the West (Sugihara  1990).  However, by the end of the  19th
century this pattern had changed so that Japan's trade with Asia rose to make up about
half its total trade.  This proportion remained unchanged until the late 1930s when intra-
Asian trade in general began to decline.  The breakdown of Japan's trade with Asia also
changed over that period.  Table 1.7 above shows that in 1892 Japan was exporting an
equal proportion of primary products and manufactured  goods to Asian countries but by
1935 only 16 percent of its exports were primary products while 81  percent were
manufactured goods.  The proportion of imports to Japan from Asia remained about the
same over that period, i.e., around 89 to 95 percent were primary products.
Sugihara (1990) argues that the rise in Japan's proportion of intra-Asian trade is
evidence of its function as an "engine of growth of intra-Asian trade."  She accounts for
this by pointing out the following: (1)  Chinese and Indian merchants carried most of
Japan's trade with Asia via their intra-Asian network during the early 1900s,  (2) Japan
knew, better than the West, how to produce goods of a certain quality and price that were
suitable for the Asian market (her previously mentioned "culture neutralization"),  and (3)
Japan adopted Western technology faster than other Asian countries which gave it an
advantage in the production of manufactured goods for export to Asia.53
12Akita emphasizes the importance to Japan and other Asian countries (except for
China) of close contact wvith the West in developing Asia's interregional trade.  He cites
as evidence the fact that these countries adopted the gold standard by the end of the  19th
century in order to facilitate the import of capital and manufactured goods from the West.
Sugihara explains, "most of the manufactured goods which served for the development of
an infrastructure  such as  railways, ports (communication system) and cities were
imported from the West, without which the intra-Asian trade would have been confined
to a centuries-old junk trade."54
After experiencing significant growth from the economic boom before World War
I,  the volume of intra-Asian trade began to decline in the late  1930s as the network
became disrupted by the Japanese invasion and war.  This was compounded  in the late
1940s when China, India, North Korea and many Southeast Asian countries substantially
withdrew from intraregional  trade as they underwent serious political changes.  The
proportion of intra-Asian trade in world trade grew rapidly again in the 1970s and
1980s."
The above discussion reveals that intra-Asian trade preceded the arrival of the
Europeans in the  16th century and extends to the present day with periods throughout of
more or less intensity.  The importance of this type of trade in the economic development
of Asia is widely acknowledged in the literature.  It is also apparent,  however, that this
type of trade did not exist in a vacuum.  In fact, its development was facilitated by
contact with the West both in earlier periods as well as in the 2 0th century.  In fact, a look
at historical trade networks gives a clear indication of  just how intertwined this
intraregional  trade was with global trade at the time; e.g.,  (1) goods produced and traded
in Asia eventually found their way to Europe and America and (2) the nature of intra-
Asian trade was characterized  by both collaboration and competition between Europeans
and Asians.  While it is possible to assess the intensity of intraregional trade by tracking
imports and exports between countries, the broader global view should be kept in mind
since most goods circulated throughout the region and the world, as is explained further
below.
Asia's Global Tradie
Although Asia-related trade can be divided conceptually into the two categories
of intra-Asian trade and global trade, in actuality the latter is really an extension of the
former.  In other words, the two overlapped and interacted  in such a way as to have
functioned as one system.  Frank (1998) observes that the "world market was really a
series of interconnected  regional markets dispersed and overlapping around the globe"
implying that the regional, national, and many local economies  of that time were part of a
single global economy.56 In his view, the identification  of "regional units" is arbitrary
and "intra-regional  ties, rio matter what their density, are no obstacle to having inter-
regional ones as well."57
To give an example of this interaction:  Although the Dutch traded in a self-
contained circuit within Asia (i.e., intra-Asian trade), many of the goods obtained there
found their way back to E,urope through exportation (i.e., global trade).  In fact, one of
their objectives in participating in intraregional trade was to obtain goods for the
European market.  Although a large portion of the silver needed by the Europeans in their
intra-Asian trade was obtained  from Japan, some was obtained globally - from the
13Americas via Europe.  Furthermore, while maritime trade between Asia and the rest of
the world was largely carried out by European ships, around  1800 there were also Asian-
built ships, nornally involved in intra-Asian trade, that often picked up cargo from
various Asian ports and carried it to Europe.58
This interaction between intraregional and global trade is demonstrated by the
trade patterns of the key Asian players during this period:  China, India, Japan and
Southeast Asia.  The involvement of these nations/regions  in Asian trade during the
modern and pre-modern eras was complex and of considerable  magnitude as described
below.
China 59
From the 1  100s to 1433,  China was the "most dynamic force in Asian trade"60
After coming into power in 1279, the Yuan (Mongol) dynasty expanded shipbuilding
(started under the Sung) for foreign trade, maritime commerce with Asia, and naval
operations.  The traditional  trading area for China at that time was the "Eastem Oceans".
In the early  1400s, the Ming emperor Yung Lo (Yong Le) undertook naval operations
outside this area to places in the Western Oceans (Indian Ocean to the east coast of Africa
including Calicut, Cochin, Malacca, Hormuz, Red Sea, Maldives, Bengal, Mogadishu,
East Africa, Ceylon, Aden, among others.)  These naval ventures were carried out for the
purpose of displaying China's power and superiority.  In furtherance of this goal, a
system of tributary relationships61 was implemented.  Korea and Japan were members of
this tributary system - the former, a permanent  member, and the latter,  a member
between  1404 and  1549.
Between  1405  and 1433 Admiral Cheng Ho (Zheng He) led seven expeditions to
the Westem Oceans.  The Chinese did not attempt to establish bases for trade there but
had some interest in obtaining medicinal plants and exotic animals.  Support for such
voyages ended after the death of Cheng Ho (1435) as it became apparent that China's
security was not enhanced by extending the tributary system to the countries of the
"Western  Oceans" and that the exorbitant cost of the voyages had contributed to a fiscal
and monetary crisis.  Although the tributary arrangements  with countries in the "Eastem
Oceans" were continued, private trade continued to be banned.  The natural reaction to
this regime was illicit private trade and piracy.  By 1567, the ban on private trade was
lifted but trade with Japan was prohibited.  This provided a favorable window of
opportunity to the Portuguese who had established a base in Macao in 1557.
China was preeminent in the world also in terms of its production capability,
particularly for silk, which was its largest export product traded primarily to other Asians,
and for porcelain ceramics.  Its great success in exporting these goods is evidenced by its
having become a "sink" for the world's silver, which was used to balance its trade surplus
with the rest of the world.62
The question remains  as to why China, which had huge "treasure ships" (much
larger than European ships) that ventured as far as the Cape of Good Hope, ceased
navigation beyond present-day Singapore and appeared  to turn inward after  1433.  While
govermment-sponsored  navigation was ended in order to concentrate on domestic  affairs,
the curtailing of private sector shipping was related to "market forces".  The price of
timber (lots of which was required in the construction of the large "treasure ships" that
were used in long trips to India and the Middle East) became prohibitively high due to its
scarcity on the central China coast.  Thus, the private traders resorted to building smaller
14ships in Southeast Asia where timber was cheaper and where Chinese diasporas existed.
The Chinese then focused on short-distance  shipping using the entrepots that existed in
areas favored by the monsoon winds.  So in fact, instead of China being completely
closed to trade at that time,  Chinese traders established a tighter network of trade closer
to home in order to maximize their profits.63
India64
As might be expected,  the center of the Indian Ocean trading sphere in 1400 to
1800 was the Indian subcontinent where many port cities developed along the east and
west coastlines.  Important among these were Diu, Cambay, Surat, Goa, Calicut,
Colombo, Madras,  and Masulipatam,  many of which served as entrep6ts.  India had an
active inland trade as well - by water and overland.  Almost all the port cities were
connected to the caravan routes into and out of their respective interior areas.
Genevieve Bouchon notes that India played an essential role in intra-Asian
(specifically Indian Ocean) trade after the departure of the Chinese in 1433.  The large
void left by the Chinese was  filled by the Bengalis, Tamils and Gujaratis  who brought
products from India, Europe and the Arab world to the markets of Malacca.6 5 She
attributes the creation of new trade networks  in the region to the Gujarati merchants.66
India tended to export more than it imported and ran a large trade surplus with
Europe (and some with West Asia) that was settled in precious metals.  This imbalance
was primarily related to its more efficient production of cotton textiles and to the
production of pepper.  These were exported to Africa, West Asia, Europe, and from there
to the Caribbean and the Americas.  Additionally,  India exported rice, pulses (peas,
beans, lentils, etc.), and vegetable oil westward to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea and
eastward to Malacca and Southeast Asia.  In exchange, India received silver and some
gold from the West - the former it re-exported or used for coins and the latter it used for
coins, jewelry and hoarding (although this is disputed by some, as discussed below.)
India also exported cotton textiles to Southeast Asia and imported spices.  It re-
exported silver there, and to China, indicating a possible trade deficit with that region.
The Coromandel coast (facing the Bay of Bengal) served as an important entrep8t
both in internal and worldwide trade.  It was also used by the Dutch and other Europeans
in their own Indian and worldwide operations.
Japan
There is evidence that Japan's  foreign trade began within Asia as early as the  13t
century.67 John Whitney Hall notes that in the  14th and 15th centuries Japan emerged "as
a major maritime power in East Asia activated by a vigorous internal economic
expansion."68 Trade with China and Korea was important in the  13th century,  and during
the 1  5 th and 1  6th centuries trade extended as far as the Straits of Malacca.  Sanderson
(1995) observes that Japan's  involvement in vigorous Far Eastern trade seemingly
occurred at the same time that China was withdrawing  from world trade.  He is of the
opinion that these events were connected and that Japan took over where China left off.
Japan participated in China's tributary trade from 1404 to  1549.69  Hall (1970)
notes that during this time Japan's  exports to China were mass commodities  and artifacts
(copper, sulfur, folding fans, screens, and primarily swords) and imports from China were
strings of cash, raw silk, porcelain, paintings, medicines,  and books.  He states
15unequivocally that Japan was "no longer an underdeveloped  member of the Chinese
world order."70
Frank (1998)  describes Japan's trade after  1560 as follows:  "Japan became a
major producer and exporter of silver and then copper to China and Southeast Asia, but
also of some gold and considerable  sulfur, as well as such goods as camphor,  iron,
swords, lacquer,  furniture, sake, tea, and high quality rice to as far away as India and
West Asia.  In return, Japan received Chinese silks and Indian cotton textiles, as well as a
whole gamut of other producer and consumer goods like lead, tin, woods, dyes, sugar,
skins, and quicksilver (used for smelting its own silver) from Korea, China, and
Southeast Asia."7
The silver that Japan produced  in abundance from the mid- 1500s, and that China
strongly desired, created a dilemma as to how this trade could be arranged. 72 China had
prohibited trade with Japan around that time so, according to Tarling (1992), the
exchange of Japanese silver for Chinese silk and other goods took place through
Southeast Asian ports, particularly Manila and Hoi An (Vietnam), until  1635 when it was
suddenly stopped.73 Maddison  (2001) claims that Chinese pirates and the Portuguese
became the primary carriers of Japanese  silver to China.
Japan's isolationist period began with the Tokugawa Shogunate.'4 Key events
leading up to total isolation included the prohibition of Christianity in 1606, the
departure/expulsion  of the English and Spanish in 1623-1624, restrictions on foreign
trade and travel in 1630, and banning of  the Portuguese  and restriction of the Dutch to a
small area in 1639.75  The traditional view is that Japan remained totally isolated and
economically stagnant after this date until its reopening in the mid-  19h century.
However, more recent literature describes a process  involving "large-scale urbanization,
commercialization  of agriculture, [...] growth in the wealth and economic importance of
the merchant  class, increased monetization of the economy, and beginnings of the factory
system"  as evidence of the economic vitality of this period.76 Ikeda (1996) has found
recent evidence from Japanese  scholars showing that foreign trade did not in fact decline
during the isolationist period.  He reports that Chinese imports of silk actually increased
after 1660 and continued until  1770.  Also, trade continued with Southeast Asia including
Burma, and even Japanese silver exports continued until the mid-18'  century.77
Southeast Asia78
Southeast Asia played a significant role in intra-Asian trade, as well as in world
trade, particularly in the period from 1580 to 1630 when it benefited from the economic
expansions in Japan, China, India, and Europe.  Its "geographical location [...] made it a
natural crossroads  and meeting point for world trade."79 Southeast Asia's trade patterns
are representative of the integration of intraregional  and global trade that existed in Asia
at that time as aptly described by Frank:  "The division of labor and pattern of trade in
Indonesia and adjacent regions combined three interrelated axes of interisland and
peninsular short-haul trade, regional trade with India and China/Japan/Ryukyu  Islands,
and world trade with West Asia, Europe, and the Americas."80 Southeast Asia imported
"cloth from India, silver from the Americas and Japan and copper-cash,  silk, ceramics
and other manufactures  from China, in exchange for its exports of pepper, spices,
aromatic woods, resins, lacquer,  tortoise shell, pearls, deerskin,  and the sugar exported by
16Vietnam and Cambodia."81 China was Southeast Asia's "major customer,  some eight
times more than Europe."82
Southeast Asia's role was also vital in that a number of its ports served as
important entrep6ts in trade among China, Japan, other parts of Eurasia, and the
Americas.  Major among these was Malacca,  founded in  1403, which served as a
turnaround point for Chinese shipping  (halted temporarily in 1433)  and used by
Gujaratis, Turks, Armenians, Arabs, Persians, and Africans  as a trading center with
Southeast and East Asia.83 In support of this trading system Southeast Asia's financial
system included a "sophisticated  and reliable money market" where money could be
borrowed at an interest rate of about 2 percent a month, similar to that in Europe.84
As is evident in the above  descriptions of the trade patterns and products of these
four economies,  there was a robust intra-Asian trade at the core of a broader global trade.
Furthermore, although one or another of these players pulled back at certain points from
the global arena, the gap was soon filled by other Asian traders so that the flow of goods
continued unabated.  The regional/global  nature of trade at that time is further
demonstrated by the flow of precious metals and their role in trade promotion.
The  Monetary Side of Trade:  Precious Metals
Precious metals (as well as copper,  coins, and shells85) were used as money to
"'settle the accounts'  of the trade deficit at each link of the chain by those who wanted to
import from the next link but did not have enough to export in return."86 Most notable
among those needing "money" to pay for their imports were the Europeans  who, it has
been claimed by some, had nothing to sell that was of interest to Asians, who in their turn
produced a considerable quantity of goods desired by the Europeans.  Consequently,
Europe imported more from Asia than Asia did from Europe.  This resulted in a
significant balance of payments problem for the Europeans.  In order to finance their
purchases of the large amounts of goods they wanted from Asia, Europeans used precious
metals.87
Attman (1991) found evidence of this in the actual export and import figures from
port records of the 17th  and 18th centuries.  There were three markets that had high
demand for bullion at that time: Asia, the Baltic, and the Levant (Eastern Mediterranean).
Invoices from that period reflect the amounts various European countries  owed to Asia
and the Baltic for imports.  He estimates  payment in silver and gold from Europe was
two-thirds the invoiced amount for Asia and between one-half and one-third for the
Baltic.  Table  1.8 shows Attman's estimates  for the export of  precious metals from
Europe to Asia and the Baltic.88 Estimates for the Levant, for which there are no precise
invoice values, are included based on the actual amounts of precious metals transported
from European ports to the Levant.
17Table  1.8
Estimated Annual Exports of Precious Metals from Europe to the East
(in  millions of rix-dollars)
Year  1600  1650  1700  1750
The Levant (Eastern Mediterranean)  1.0  2.0  2.0  2.0
The Baltic region  1.7 - 2.0  2.3 - 3.0  2.3 - 3.0  2.3 - 3.0
The route round the Cape (Asia)  1.0  '1.7  3.3  5.7
Total  3.7 - 4.0  6.0 -6.7  7.6 - 8.3  10.0-  10.7
* Includes silver from Japan used by VOC to meet demand from 1635 to 1668.
Source: Attman (1991: Table 4,17)
The need for precious metals increased markedly from the mid- 16th century when
Portuguese trade around the Cape increased,  and even more so in the  17th century when
the Dutch (VOC) and English (EIC) began their Euro-Asian trade.  Attman's estimates
reflect this.  While exports to the Levant and Baltic regions remained unchanged from
1650 to 1750, those to Asia increased by 5 percent between  1600 and 1750 at which time
they reached 5.7 million rix-dollars.
Table  1.9
Exports of Silver and Gold from Western Europe, 1601-1780
(tonnes of "silver equivalent")
To the  To Eastem  Dutch (VOC) to  British (EIC)  to
Baltic  Mediterranean  Asia  Asia  Total
16014-1650  2,475  2,500  425  250  5,650
1651-1700  2.800  2,500  775  1,050  7,125
1701-1750  2,800  2,500  2,200  2,450  9,950
1751-1780  1,980  1,500  1,445  1,450  6,375
Total 1601-1780  10,055  9,000  4,845  5,200  29,100
Source: Maddison (2001: Table 2-10, 65);
Barrett,  in Tracy (1990: 251)  (he does not show his equivalence conversion ratio for gold.)
As further evidence of the significant growth in precious metal exports from
Europe to the East over the 17th and  18'h centuries, Angus Maddison (2001) estimates
export levels in tonnes of "silver equivalent".  (See Table  1.9.)  Although Tables  1.8 and
1.9 are not directly comparable,89 a similar pattern can be observed in both tables.  Table
1.9 shows the amount exported to Asia (by the VOC and EIC) increased 6 percent
between 1601  and 1750 when it reached a total of  4,650 tonnes before declining by
nearly 40 percent over the next thirty years.  The estimates for the total shipped to Asia
are over 10,000  tonnes for the two centuries, but the amount was almost certainly more
than this since only the Dutch and British exports are shown here while other European
countries (including Portugal,  France, Denmark and Sweden) were also engaged in this
activity,  albeit to a lesser degree.
18In addition to being the major importer of precious metals, Asia was also a
producer of gold and silver.  In fact, while the Europeans were major exporters of
precious metals, they produced very little of it themselves and, thus, had to obtain it
elsewhere.  The major and minor producers  worldwide of these metals are listed in Table
1.10.
Table  1.10
I  Major Producers  c  Linor  Producers
Siiver  klexico  Northest Europe
Per&L  Persia
Japall  Cenctal  Asia
Burma/SiamiViemam
Gold  West and Southeast  Africa  Japan
Spanish America (in 1  6'h c.)  Persia





'In  addition,  Prakash (1986-  84) mentions  Bolivia and Columbia as large South American silver producers.
2Copper and tin were sometimes alloyed; both were used for low-value  coinage.
Source: Frank (1998: Table 3.1,  140)
Earlier on, copper was predominantly used in Asia as currency but silver
eventually displaced copper (and also gold) as supplies increased.  During this period,
there was "at least a trimetallic world market, which however was predominantly  on a de
facto silver standard."90 For this reason (and because of limitations of time and space in
this study), our focus will be primarily on silver.
Silver
Rich deposits of silver discovered and mined in the Americas constituted the
"most imnportant component of the increased total availability" of precious metals in the
16th century.9t This silver traveled to Asia via two main routes: (1) from South America
via Spain to Europe and then on to Asia and (2) from Mexico across the Pacific to
Manila.
Asia's producers included Japan as the major supplier in the region starting in the
16th  century.  Silver had become  a very important commodity in Japan in the  16th and  17'h
centuries  with only Spanish America being a laiger producer and thus a major competitor
in the global market at that time.92 Estimates of Japan's production are 50 tons per year
between  1560 and 1600, and 150 to  190 tons per year between  1600 and 1640.9
19Frank (1998) averages the estimates of Barrett (1990)94 and Attman (1986) to
arrive at the amounts of silver production, trade routes and ultimate destinations that are
shown in Table 1.11.
Table  1.1 1
World Silver Production, Exports, and Reeeipts
(values in thousands of tons)
Time Period  Location and Amount Produced  Shipped to  Shipped to Asia
Europe  directly or on-
shipped from
Europe to Asia
16a' century  Americas - 17  17
Japan - 2  2
17th  century  Americas - 37  27  13
Japan - 7  7
18th century  Americas - 75  54  26
1600-1800  Americas - 3 to  10 up to 25  All to Manila
Source: Frank (1998: Map 3.1,  148)
One notable feature of the silver trade is that China received a very large share of
this metal from all sources and via all routes.  According to Frank's estimates, China
received nearly all the silver shipped to Asia via Europe and the Pacific in the 1  7th and
18th centuries.  Additionally, Japan's 9,000 tons produced in the  16th and 17t  centuries
went to China.  Thus, for over two and a half centuries up to 1800,  a total of 48,000 tons
of silver from Europe and Japan and another  10,000 tons via Manila, as well as other
silver produced in continental  Southeast and Central Asia and in China itself is estimated
to have ended up in China.  He estimates that this total of about 60,000 tons was
approximately half the world's production during that time.95
More recent calculations by Von Glahn (1 996a) result in lower estimates for the
amount of silver that went to China.  These are shown in Table 1.12.
Table  1.12




Japan  Philippines  to Macao  Total
1550-1600  1,280  584  380  2,244
1601-40  1,968  719  148  2,835
1641-85  1,586  108  0  1,694
1685-1700  41  137  0  178
Total 1550-1700  4,875  1,548  528  6,951
Source: Maddison (2001: Table 2-9, 64); Von Glahn (1996a:  140 and 232).Frank (1998), however, finds von Glahn's estimation procedure to be
"questionable" but calculates that even with these lower estimates,  the total received by
China from the mid- I6ti'  to mid- I7 th centuries  was between one-fourth and one-third of
total world silver production.96
Various historians claim that most of the silver that ended up in China never came
out again causing China to be referred to as the "sink" for silver during this period.  Much
the same  is said of precious metals (silver and gold) that went into India.  The traditional
theory is that China and. India hoarded these metals and used them for decorative
purposes rather than as money in commerce  and investment.  This resulted in these
countries being labeled as financially unsophisticated  and not interested in the expansion
of investment and capitalism causing Asia to be viewed as "external  to the European
world-economy  [  ...]  .97
One historian (among several) who disagrees with this theory is Om Prakash who
contends that the inflow of increasing  quantities of money into India in the  17th century
facilitated an increase in the degree of monetization in the economy, to which the rise of
banking firms was in part related.98 Chaudhuri (1986) also refutes the "hoarding" theory
by saying, "the absorption of gold and silver by the Asian economies  in the early modern
period had little to do with a 'hoarding'  social mentality but was grounded on an
international pattern of economic  specialization, on payments mechanism, and socially-
determined demand which had existed for at least a millennium."99 As stated by Frank
(1998)  "[ ...] the world-wide  flow of money to Asia and Russia is evidence precisely that
they were parts of the same world economy  as Europe and the Americas."100
Asia's Soft and  Hard Infrastructure:  Merchants  and
Ports
A major contributor to Asia's historically significant role in the world economy,
and one that has been subject to some misconception,  is that of the Asian merchant or
trader.  Traditionally, Asian traders were labeled as "peddlers" who hawked small
amounts of high value rnerchandise  such as spices, pepper, pearls, perfumes, drugs  and
diamonds.  This view, however,  has in recent times been replaced with a more accurate
image of the Asian trader - one that is closer to that of a western trader; i.e., a true
capitalist, wholesaler,  or merchant selling both luxury goods and ordinary commodities
on a large scale.  While there were indeed many small traders with little capital in Asia,
there were also many "wealthy magnates"  who had large amounts of capital.  Also, in
addition to luxury goods, cheap and medium-quality textiles and staple food items (rice,
wheat,  and oil) were traded within Asia.'I'
It is now being acknowledged that the Asian merchant was not inferior to the
European merchant " in. terms of their commercial  operations and business acumen."'1 02
In fact, Asian merchants  could compete successfully against the Europeans in an open
market because they required lower profit margins (10 to  15 percent) than the European
Companies, which wanted 40 to 70 percent to cover their high overhead costs.103 The
only times the Europeans  were able to succeed against the Asians was when they resorted
to military might as did the VOC in Banda in  1621 in order to gain control of the spice
trade.'1 04
21Morineau (1999) identifies a number of Asian merchants as "big-timers",
including the Muslim merchants from the Gulf of Cambay and Gujarat who "ascended to
the level of kingmakers" in the  12th,  13th and 14'h centuries.  He states, "Vasco da
Gama'05 did not come to an ocean that was void of shipping or to territories  without
markets or merchants."' 06 In the  17'h and 18'h  centuries, there were the merchant princes
of India who have been favorably compared with the Medicis,  Fiiggers and Tripps of
Europe. 10 7
China also had its share of merchants and entrepreneurs  including private sea
traders of the late Yuan period (many of whom continued trading illegally in the early
Ming period), Ming'08 government traders on government ships (until the  1430s), and
private Chinese traders based in overseas settlements  (diasporas).  These Chinese
diasporas existed primarily in Southeast Asia and the emigres tended to live together in
self-contained Chinese communities.  Most of them also had strong connections to the
mainland because of a strong sense of family duty fostered by Confucianism  and
emotional attachment to their native villages.  There were also reported to be a number of
Chinese Muslims among the early overseas traders who have been credited with the
spread of the Islamic religion in Indonesia.'09
Trade diasporas existed in many locales in Asia and served to facilitate trade in
the region.  Besides the Chinese, there were also the Maharatshi merchants from Cambay
and Surat in Malacca, and in other port cities in Southeast, South, and West Asia. "0
Concerning ports in the region, the above discussion of trade routes gives a clear
indication of the large number of ports established by both Asians and Europeans that
were scattered throughout Asia to service the intra-Asian and Euro-Asian trade.  Frank
(1998) aptly describes these as "a sort of necklace of port-city emporia strung around
Asia."" '  Some of these functioned as entrepots  (i.e., ports or port cities that served as
commercial centers where goods are brought for import and export.)  Several existed on
the west coast of India, including Diu, Cambay and Surat in Gujarat and the Portuguese
entrepot at Goa, where they functioned as ports of call for monsoon-driven  ships from the
Red Sea and Persian Gulf as well as turnaround points for the overland caravan trade
with Persia, Russia, Central Asia, and others."  12 Some also existed in Southeast Asia
(e.g., Manila and Malacca) and in West Asia (e.g., Aden and Hormuz) where their trade
relations were greater with the rest of the world than with their own surrounding area. 1" 3
The modern day Asian entrepot is epitomized by Singapore,  which has functioned as
such since the early 19'h century.
Petri (1993)  distinguishes the "treaty port system"  developed in the mid- 9I'
century as a key contributor to Asian interdependence.  Britain initiated this system when
it abolished its monopoly through the EIC and moved to gain open access to ports
through the Treaty of Nanking (ending the Opium War of 1840-42) and other treaties.
Other nations followed Britain's lead resulting in a rise in trade through the large ports
that had been developed by the Europeans (i.e., Hong Kong, Manila, Shanghai,  and
Singapore).  These entrepots facilitated not only trade between the home country and its
colonies, but also a large proportion of intraregional trade throughout Asia.
Most of these ports still exist, although perhaps with a different name and with
more or less importance  than in previous centuries.  They constitute a "hard"
infrastructure  that serves  the network of Asia's modern day trade.  Their continued
importance is clearly demonstrated in the discussion of present-day trade patterns and
22relationships  in Chapter IV.  And, while the merchants themselves,  of course, no longer
exist, the merchant legacy provides a "soft" infrastructure of knowledge and experience
that continues to affect present-day trade in the region.
The Impact  of Colonialism
It could be said that in the early 20 th century, nearly all the countries of the East,
and over half the world's population,  were under some form of  colonial rule.  First the
Europeans and later the Americans  administered direct rule over the various countries
and territories of Asia.  The primary colonizers were:  Britain  - India, Malaysia,  and
Singapore  [Burma (MyEnmar)  annexed in 1886];  the Netherlands  - Indonesia; the United
States - the Philippines (having earlier been under Spanish rule); and France  -
Indochina.  Although China, Persia, Thailand and Turkey were not colonies, they signed
treaties that "reduced their sovereignty in commercial matters, and granted extraterritorial
rights to foreigners."  114
Although it was expected by some that these nations would descend into
"barbarism" upon departure of  the colonialists, this did not happen since many Asian
nations had long traditions of high-level civilization that gave them a sense of identity
and nationhood.  That is not to say, however,  that the region was unaffected by the
experience and, in more ways than one, the effect was negative.  Paul Bairoch, upon
finding that the positive impact of colonization on the West's economic development was
limited, commented, "If  the West did not gain much from colonialism, it does not mean
that the Third World did not lose much."  In his opinion,  "[ ... ] a large number of negative
structural features of the process of economic underdevelopment  have historical roots
going back to European colonization."' 
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Two major negative  consequences of colonialism are discussed below.
De-industrialization
There is no doubt that de-industrialization  (the disappearance of industries)
occurred  as a result of colonization even though the precise extent of that may be difficult
to ascertain.  India's textile industry, for example, suffered under the British in two
respects.  Firstly, the British bureaucracy in India, as well as the Indians who worked
under them, preferred European clothing, which led to the destruction of about three
quarters of the domestic  demand for luxury handicrafts (fine muslins, jewellery, luxury
clothing and footwear,  etc.)"1 6 Secondly,  after 1813 English textiles began to flood India
going from about 1 million square yards of cotton cloth in 1814 to  1,050 million in
1890.  17  Bairoch (1993) attributes  this to the EIC's loss of its trade monopoly (a
monopoly that prevented imports of textile goods into India) and to the technological
progress made by the English spinning industry which resulted in an English worker's
productivity by 1830 becoming ten to fourteen times higher (for an average yarn) than
that of an Indian worker."1 8 The result was cheap British textiles flowing freely into
India.
Production costs in India were raised as a result of a large number of British
workers being employed in the textile industry there.  It is estimated  that British
employees made up 42 percent of the managerial and supervisory staff of the Bombay
textile industry in 1895 (but dropped to 28 percent in 1925).  Furthermore,  the British did
23not undertake to provide technical education or training  and managerial  experience to
Indians, thus hampering Indian industrial efficiency.19l
Under these circumstances  it was obviously difficult for India to establish a
modem textile industry.  Bairoch suggests that by 1870-80 local industry and artisans
provided 25-45 percent of local textile consumption (or a level of de-industrialization
equal to 55-75 percent.)120
De-industrialization was not restricted to the textile industry of India.  Other
industries (e.g., iron), as well as other colonized countries,  suffered the same fate.
Bairoch claims that de-industrialization may have been even worse in other Asian
countries.  He cites China as an exception because  its local industry was better able to
survive due to a later start to the inflow of manufactured goods from the West, more local
autonomy, and the large size of the country itself.  In 1890, its local textiles might have
supplied around 50-70 percent of local consumption. 121
Table 1.13 below shows Bairoch's estimates of industrialization  levels from 1750
to  1990 for the "Third World" (including Africa and Latin America in addition to Asia)
and developed countries.  The differences are immediately obvious.  Until  1860, the
"Third World's" level of industrialization  exceeds that of developed countries.  This,
however,  is reversed in 1860.  Subsequently, the level for the "Third World" begins to
decline (until 1928) while that in developed countries accelerates.  On a per capita basis,
the level was always  lower in the Third World (from 1750, at least) than it was in
developed countries but the difference widens considerably after 1860.
Table  1.13
Levels of Industrialization, 1750 - 1990
(United Kingdom  In  1900 = 100)
Total  Per Capita
Developed  Developed
Third World  Countries  Third World  countries
1750  93  34  7  8
1800  99  47  6  8
1830  112  73  6  1i
1860  83  143  4  16
1900  60  481  2  35
1913  70  863  2  55
1928  98  1,260  3  71
1938  122  1,560  4  81
1953  200  2,870  5  135
1973  927  8,430  14  315
1980  1,320  9,910  19  347
1990  2,480  12,090  29  412
Source: Bairoch (1993: Table 8.1,91)
24Decline  in Standard  of Living
By 1950 (the end of the colonization period), the "Third World" economies had a
much lower standard of living than did developed countries.  Bairoch (1993)  attributes
this difference to a century and a half of Industrial Revolution experienced by the
developed countries that boosted their standard of living fivefold.  In his estimation, the
average "Third World" country in the  1950s had nearly the same standard of living as it
did in 1800, or at least no better than 10-20 percent higher.  In terms of real income per
capita122 it was five to six times lower than that of developed countries.  Labor
productivity in the agricultural sector of "Third World"' countries in 1950 was seven
times lower than that in Western countries and 30-40 percent below that of developed
countries in  1800.123
The patterns found by Bairoch are supported by data compiled by Maddison
(2001) as shown in Table  1.14 below.
Table  1.14
Levels of GDP  Per Capita in European Colonial Powers and  Former Colonies, 1500-1998
_____________  (1990 International dol ars)
1500  1700  1820  1  913  1950  1998
Britaina  762  1,405  2,121  5,150  6,907  18,714
France  727  986  1,230  3,485  5,270  19,558
Italy  1,100  1,100  1,117  2,564  3,502  17,759
Netherlands  754  2,110  1,821  4,049  5,996  20,224
China  600  600  600  552  439  3,117
India  550  550  533  673  619  1,746
Indonesia  565  580  612  904  840  3,070
' Refers to England,  Scotland andi Wales for 1500-1913.  Nohrhem Ireland is included for 1950 and 1998.
Source: Maddison  (2001: Table 2-22a,  90)
This table shows that GDP per capita for India and Indonesia increased in the
early colonial period but declined toward its end - between  1913 and 1950.  China's per
capita GDP, on the other hand, dropped between 1820 and 1913.
Maddison also developed the following tables (1.15 and  1.16) for Indonesia and
India, respectively,  as "a crude measure of  the burden of colonial rule and the colonialist
gain."124
25Table  1.15
The Dutch "Drain"  on Indonesia,  1698-1930
Indonesian export surplus  Indonesian export surplus
as percent of Indonesian  as percent of Dutch net
net domestic product  domestic product
1698-1700  0.7  1.1
1778-80  0.9  1.7
1868-72  7.4  5.5
1911-15  7.6  8.7
1926-30  10.3  8.9
Source: Maddison  (2001: Table 2-21a, 87)
According  to the estimates in Table 1.15,  the amount of Dutch income in
Indonesia that was remitted out of the country jumped from 0.9 percent in the pre-
colonial period (1778-80) to 7.4 percent in the early part of the colonial period (which
started in 1815).  This reached as high as 10.3 percent by 1926-30.  This is despite the
fact that the Dutch reduced the percentage of their Indonesian income remitted out of the
country between 1870 and 1921  as the economy was opened up to private enterprise.
Their income as a percentage of Indonesian domestic product had risen from about 1.4
percent in 1700 to about 17 percent in 1921-38.125  It can also be seen in the right column
of Table  1.15 that Indonesian income added significantly to the Netherlands'  domestic
product by the late  1920s (8.9 percent).  According to Maddison (1989), from 1840
onwards, this income made up the preponderance of Dutch foreign income.
Table  1.16
The British "Drain" on India,  1868-1930
Indian export surplus as  Indian  export surplus as
percent of Indian net  percent of British net
domestic product  domestic product
1868-72  1.0  1.3
1911-15  1.3  1.2
1926-30  0.9  0.9
Source: Maddison (2001: Table 2-21b, 87)
Table  1.16 reveals  that the "drain" on India was considerably less than that on
Indonesia.  British income in India was only about 5 percent in 1921-38 (versus  17
percent for the Dutch in Indonesia) and of this, only  1.7 percent was remitted.1 26 Also,
the addition of Indian income to Britain's domestic product was only 0.9 percent in  1926-
30 compared to 8.9 percent for the Dutch (from Indonesia)  in the same period.
26Other Effects of Colonialism
At first glance, Britain's rapid construction of railroads in India and the first
mechanized  textile mills in Asia might be perceived  as positive outcomes of colonialism.
Pomeranz and Topik (1999), however, point out that neither of these contributed to
economic growth.  Like the textile industry, the railways built in India used British
equipment, engineers and coal, and thus did not result in the transfer of technology and
skills.  India's textile mills lacked sufficient resources and were unable to develop as well
as did their counterparts  in China and Japan,  which had come under government
protection prior to World War I.
Another legacy of colonialism in Asia is the diversity of traditions and influences
that arose from having the region colonized by more than one foreign nation.  While
diversity can often bring richness and depth to a society,  it can also make it difficult to
reach consensus on important issues.  This phenomenon has affected to some degree
Asia's progress towards  regional cooperation.  For example,  the political and legal
systems in the Philippines  (colonized by America), Indonesia (colonized by the
Netherlands),  and Malaysia and Singapore (colonized by Britain),  as well as Thailand
(not colonized), vary wicdely.' 27
Furthermore,  as a result of having achieved much desired independence after
colonization, some counTries have gravitated more toward nationalism than toward
regionalism.  Also, the problems confronted in the post-colonialist period (e.g., the
struggle for economic development) may foster a tendency to focus on national, as
opposed to regional, issues.
The issue of free trade is often mentioned as a positive occurrence of the colonial
period.  However, this is not as clear as purported.  While Britain ostensibly promoted
open trading with its colonies, it protected its own textile industry (with around  100
percent tariffs) from inexpensive  imports from India during the 17th, and  18  th centuries.  In
the late  19th century, during Britain's "free trade" period, it closed Indian industrial goods
markets to the non-British. 
28 The Dutch, on the other hand, did not espouse  open trading
in its colony of Indonesia as it did not perceive free trade there to be potentially
profitable.  The Dutch realized they would have been unable to compete successfully
against the British and American traders who were more powerful  at the time.'29
Another legacy of colonialism  is in the area of FDI.  Until the early 1980s, FDI in
Asia came primarily from Europe and America with the concentrations  following
traditional colonialist lines;  i.e., U.S.  investors dominating in the Philippines and
European investors in other Southeast Asian countries.130 It is questionable whether or
not this inflow of capital from former colonialists  was a good thing or not.  According to
Fan Gang (2000), "Most of the former colonial territories, which enjoyed a high (maybe
the highest) degree of freedom of commodity trade, capital inflows  and technology
transfer, did not prosper and still remain in the category of the most backward
countries."' 3'  He emphasizes that while open markets, or globalization can bring capital
and technology to developing countries, other requirements, such as institutions  and
market management capability  are just as necessary for a country to compete globally.
These factors, however,  are not "mobile"  and thus do not come along with globalization
because they are "national-specific  and historically  constrained."1 3 2
Examples have been provided herein of the colonizers'  failure to train the local
population in managemenit skills, preferring to fill such positions themselves.  Having
27been "run" by the colonizers  for a long period of time, the local populace was hindered in
the development of its own institutions  and management  capability.  Therefore, the
capital and technology provided by the colonizing nations was only part of what these
developing countries needed to compete globally.  They were thus left handicapped upon
the departure of their colonizers.
Concluding Remarks
The review of Asian economic history in this chapter leads to a number of
generalized  observations concerning  the trade patterns  and economic development of the
region over a period encompassing hundreds of years.  Asia was the source of a wide
variety of goods, both primary and manufactured,  that were highly desired throughout the
region itself and in other parts of the world.  The production of these goods derived not
only from the rich primary resources in the region but also from a large and highly
civilized population whose skills were technologically  sophisticated for the time.  As a
result, Asia maintained  the major share of world GDP (in absolute amounts) throughout
most of the previous millennium and even had higher per capita income than did Europe
in the pre-modern era (prior to about 1500) and, depending upon which estimates are
used, possibly even up to  1800.
Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, there was an active intra-Asian trade that
covered a triangular area from India in the West, to China and Japan in the Northeast, to
Southeast Asia.  This intraregional trade was eventually joined by the Europeans  for
whom it became a valuable source of profits.  Asia's global trade was conducted in a
complex pattern involving many routes: Asia to Africa, Asia to Europe, Asia to the
Americas via Europe, and Asia directly to the Americas from Manila.  While this trade
was carried out primarily through the use of European ships, Asians were prominently
involved,  directly and indirectly, in its conduct.  Asia's intraregional  trade and global
trade were interactive and mutually promoting.  Developing from this complex trading
network were a port system (hard infrastructure) and a merchant class (soft infrastructure)
that continue to serve the region well today.
On the monetary side, Asian trade was facilitated by the use of precious metals  as
a form of currency.  The fact that Asia produced more goods desired by Europe than vice
versa created a balance of payments problem for the Europeans, which they resolved by
using precious metals (particularly silver) to pay for their Asian purchases.  While much
of this silver came  from the Americas, Japan was a large producer within Asia.
In contrast to its strength and prominence in earlier periods, Asia's economy
weakened in the latter part of the millennium due in part to the effect of the Industrial
Revolution in Europe and the colonization of a number of Asian nations.  Colonialism
had a largely negative impact on the region resulting  in de-industrialization  and a decline
in the standard of living, among other things.  Although the colonialists did bring capital
and technology to their colonies, their failure to provide training and management
experience to the local population meant that the colonies were poorly equipped to
compete on a global level once independence was attained.
Economic history tells us that Asia has been an open region fully involved in the
world economic  system for much of the previous millennium and that it played a
prominent role in worldwide trade and the global division of labor during that time.  At
the same time, the concept of intraregional trade is not a new one for the region although
28the intensity of this trade has fluctuated from time to time throughout history.  If it
continues to exist today, this global/intraregional  network has profound implications  for
regional integration in East Asia.  We will follow this theme throughout the following
chapters, where we will examine in the current period East Asia's trade and investment,
as well as its financial and monetary systems as these relate to regional  integration and
cooperation.
29Chapter  11 -East Asia Today
The review of Asian economic history in Chapter I revealed two aspects of trade
in the region (i.e., intraregional  and global) that overlapped  and interacted  in such a way
as to have effectively functioned as one system.  This, in addition to the evidence of
Asia's prominent role in the global economy at that time, supports the argument that
Asian trade has been open and global for centuries.
In this chapter, we will take a look at the region in the current period and focus on
two characteristics that have figured significantly in the development of East Asian
regional cooperation;  i.e., diversity and openness.  Certain economic  and social indicators
will provide an overview of the region in terms of economic size and development,
educational level, life expectancy,  and ethnic and religious breakdown.  These will reveal
the heterogeneity of East Asia, particularly in comparison with other regions of the
world; e.g., North America (herein represented by NAFTA) and Europe (represented by
the EU).3  Other indicators will reveal the degree  of East Asia's openness and
integration with the global economy.  Relative to these indicators, the significance of the
member composition of various regional institutions (e.g., ASEAN and APEC) will be
explored. 134
A Diverse  Region
If any single word can be used to describe East Asia, that word is "diverse".
Nearly every aspect of the region can be characterized as diverse whether it be country
size, ethnicity, religion, language, politics, or economic development.  Compared to
Europe, for example, "[ ...] East Asia is characterized  by greater diversity in terms of
size, the level of economic  development, industrial structures, the depth of financial
markets, and broad institutional frameworks  [...  .].,135
East Asia's ethnic, religious and political diversity is clearly demonstrated  in
Table S.1 in the Statistical Appendix,' 36 which provides a breakdown in these areas for
each country.  With few exceptions, the countries of East Asia are home to varied
populations that in the aggregate espouse nearly every religion in the world.  Some ethnic
groups (e.g., Chinese and Malay) are present in several  countries - as a majority in some
and a minority in others.  The small country of Myanmar claims  135 ethnic groups within
eight major races, whereas  Japan and Korea each are home to only one ethnic group with
just a small minority of one other.  Systems of government include variations on
constitutional monarchies, republics (independent and parliamentary),  communist states,
and military governments,  among others.
Illiteracy and life expectancy  data for these countries reveal further heterogeneity.
For example, Table S.2 shows the illiteracy level in 1999 to be extremely low for Korea
(1 percent and 4 percent for males and females, respectively),  but very high for Cambodia
(41 percent and 79 percent, respectively).  The difference in life expectancy  among
countries is also wide - for Japan and Hong Kong it is above  80 years, while for
Cambodia and Lao PDR it is only 54 years.
The heterogeneity  reflected in these social indicators  is in part related to the
region's economic diversity.  Table 2.1 below shows basic measures of economic  size,
including land area, population level and density,  and gross national income (GNI).
30Output or gross domestic product (GDP) is covered in a subsequent table."37 Financial
market size and degree of financial development will be dealt with in Chapter V.
31Table 2.1
Size of the Asian Economy -1999 
Population  PPP GM  Per
Surface Area  Population  Density  GNI  GM Per Capita  PPP GNI  Capita
1000 Km
2 (millions)  (per  Ki
2)  (USS billions)  (USS)  (USS  billions)  (USS)
Brunei Darussalam  6  0.3  61  7.8  24,630
Camtodia  181  12.0  67  3.0  260  16  1,350
indonesia  1,905  207.0  114  125.0  600  550  2,660
Lao PDR  237  5.0  22  1.5  290  7  1,430
Mataysia  330  23.0  69  76.9  3,390  173  7,640
Myanma  677  45.0  68  _
PhiNppines  300  74.0  249  78.0  1,050  296  3,990
Singapore  1  4.0  6,384  95.4  24,150  88  22,310
Thailand  513  60.0  118  121.1  2,010  358  5.950
Vietnam  332  78.0  238  28.7  370  144  1,860
China  9.598  1,254.0  134  979.9  _  780  4,452  3,550
Hong Kong SA  _  7.0  165.1  24.570  152  22,570
Taiwan  36  22.0  611  290.5  13,235
Japan  378  127.0  336  4,054.5  32.030  3,186  25,170
Korea  99  47.0  475  397.9  8,490  728  15.530
Australia  7,741  19.0  2  397.3  20,950  452  23,850
New Zealand  271  4.0  14  53.3  13,990  67  17.630
Canada  9,971  30.0  3  614.0  20,140  776  25,440
Chile  757  15.0  20  69.6  4,630  126  8,410
Mexdco  1,958  97.0  51  428.9  4,440  780  8,070
Papua New Guinea  463  5.0  10  3.8  810  11  2,260
Peru  1,285  25.0  20  53.7  2.130  113  4,480
Russia  17,075  146.0  9  329.0  2,250  1,022  6,990
United States  9,364  278.0  30  8,879.5  31,910  8,878  31,910
ASEAN  4,476  508.0  113  529.6  1,043  1.632  3,213
ASEAN +  3  14,551  1,936.0  133  5,961.9  3,079  9,998  5.164
APEC  62,377  2,522.01  40  17,242.1  6,837  22,352  8,863
NAFTA  21,293  405.0  19  9,922.4  24,500  10,434  25,763
EU  3,247  376.4  116  8,434.4  22,408  8,296  22,040
GNI = gross nationai income;  GNI per capita is calculated using  the World Bank Atlas method; PPP is purchasing  power parity.
Brunei Darussalam -GNI data is 1998.
Taiwan data not precisely comparable to others. Taken from Taiwan Government Natb.  Stats. GNI data is 'GNP  at Current  Prices'.
Source: Wold Bank's World Developmfent  Indicators 2001
The first  10 countries listed in the above table are the member economies of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).138 This group comprises  countries
that range in size from only 1,000 sq. km. (Singapore, a city-state) to nearly 2 million sq.
km. (Indonesia, a group of more than 17,000 islands).  Population size ranges from the
smallest of around 300 thousand (Brunei Darussalam)  to 207 million (Indonesia).
The GNI per capita reveals wide differences  in income levels  for ASEAN
members with Brunei Darussalam and Singapore  reporting the highest and Cambodia, the
lowest.  The World Bank ranks Singapore 22""  worldwide for this measure'3 9 and
Cambodia,  187th.  The newest members of ASEAN (Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam)
have GNIs well below those of the original members.  (Data for Myanmar are not
available.)
The original ASEAN-5  (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand) was  a fairly homogeneous  group.  Its enlargement with the addition of new
32members (Brunei Darussalam,  Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam) brought
more diversity.  Heterogeneity would increase even further with the addition of the "Plus-
Three" (ASEAN-Plus-Three  or APT) countries of China, Japan and South Korea.
China's enormous population of 1.3 billion people dwarfs that of every other APT
country.  Japan's GNI per capita does the same for income, although on a PPP basis it is
not far above that of Singapore (1999).
The effect of adding the Plus-Three countries to ASEAN is immediately visible in
the comparison of regional groups  at the bottom of Table 2.1.  GNI in absolute terms  is
$530 billion for ASEAN but jumps to $5,962 billion for ASEAN+3, over ten times
greater.  Of course, this difference is primarily  due to Japan's enormous GNI level of
$4,055 billion.  On a PPP basis, however, the GNI level of ASEAN+3  is six times that of
ASEAN due more to China's  $4,452 billion than to Japan's lower $3,186 billion.
However, when China's enormous population is taken into account (in the GNI per capita
figures), its level drops far below that of Japan - even on a PPP basis.
Taking the analysis one step further to include all the countries in APEC, the level
of diversity increases even more, particularly with the addition of the United States.  In
addition to the increasedL heterogeneity in the ethnic, religious and political mix of APEC,
the overall economic  developmental level of the group  shifts considerably.  With the
exclusion of Cambodia,  Lao PDR and Myanmar (not members of APEC) and the
inclusion of Australia,  New Zealand, Canada, Taiwan and Hong Kong, the pendulum
swings towards the more economically developed side.  Thus the shift from ASEAN+3  to
APEC leaves behind the  smaller economies of East Asia and includes some much larger
economies outside the region.
Some perspective  can be gained through comparisons  with the EU nations.
Indicators of the EU's economic size for  1999 appear in Table 2.2 below.
Table 2.2
Size  of  the  EU Economy
1999
_  opulation  prir  P  I rer
Area  Population  Density  GNI  GNI  per capita  PPP GNI  capita
1000  Km'  (millions)  (per Km')  (USS billions)  (US$)  (USS billions)  (USS)
Austria  84  8.0  98  205.7  25,430  199  24,600
Belgium  33  10.0  312  252.1  24,650  263  25,710
Denmark  43  5.0  126  170.7  32.050  13i  25,600
Finland  338  5.0  17  127.8  24,730  117  22,600
France  552  59.0  107  1,453.2  24,170  1,349  23,020
Germany  357  82.0  235  2,103.8  25.620  1,930  23,510
Greece  132  11.0  82  127.6  12,110  166  15,800
Ireland  70  4.0  54  80.6  21,470  84  22.460
Italy  301  58.0  196  1,162.9  20,170  1,268  22,000
Luxembourg  3  0.4  166  18.6  42,930  18  41,230
Netherlands  41  16.0  466  397.4  25,140  386  24,410
Pcrtugal  92  10.0  109  110.2  11,030  158  15,860
Spain  506  39.0  79  583.1  14,800  704  17,85
Sweden  450  9.0  22  236.9  26,750  196  22,150
United Kingdom  245  60.0  246  1,403.8  23,590  1.322  22,220
Total EU  3,247  376.4  1161  8,434.4  22,408  8,296  22,04i
GNI = gross national Income;  GNI  per capita Is  calculated using the Worid  Bank Atlas method;  PPP is purchasing pawer  parity.
Source: The World Bank. Worid Development  Indicators  2001
33For the EU, differences  in population size among nations are not as wide as for
Asia.  Although Luxembourg's population is extremely small (400,000),  the largest
country in the EU (Germany) has only 82 million people, which is minuscule compared
to China's  1.3 billion.
Two observations can be made from the GNI figures.  Firstly, there is the
difference  in the aggregate level of economic development between the two regions -
East Asia comprises ten developing economies,  four NIEs and one developed economy.
On the other hand, the EU comprises  15 exclusively developed economies.
Secondly, the uniform level of development among the EU countries  is readily
observable  in the GNI per capita figures, which are mostly between $20,000 and $30,000
with a few exceptions at both the low and high ends.  The lowest World Bank ranking for
the EU economies  is 49 th place for Portugal, although most countries are among the top
30 nations in the world in this category.  Comparatively, most of the East Asian
economies ranked between 80th place and 200t  place.  (There are slightly over 200
countries in the ranking).  Japan (7h), Korea (5 4th), Hong Kong (1 9 )), and Singapore
(22nd)  are exceptions.  (Taiwan is not ranked.)
34Table 2.3
Gross Domestic Product - 1999
Percent ot
GDP Per  Percent of  Percent of  Percent of  ASEAN +3
GDP  Capita  World GDP  APEC GDP  ASEAN GDP  GDP
(US$ nmillions)  USS  _  _  _  _  _%
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia  3,117  260  0.01  0.58  0.05
Indonesia  142,511  688  0.46  0.79  26.36  2.27
Lao PDR  1,432  286  0.00  0.26  0.02
Malaysia  79,039  3,436  0.26  0.44  14.62  1.26
Myanmar  __
Philippines  76,559  1,035  0.25  0.43  14.16  1.22
Singapore  84,945  21,236  0.28  0.47  15.71  1.35
Thailand  124,369  2,073  0.40  0.69  23.00  1.98
Vietnam  28,682  368  0.09  0.16  5.31  0.46
China  989,465  789  3.20  5.50  15.75
Hong Kong SAR  158,943  22,706  0.51  0.88
Taiwan (1993 &  1999)'  287,881  13,086  0.93  1.60
Japan  4,346,922  34,228  14.08  24.18  69.17
Korea  406,940  8,658  1.32  2.26  6.48
Australia  404,033  21,265  1.31  2.25
New Zealand  54,651  13,663  0.18  0.30
Canada  634,898  21,163  2.06  3.53
Chile  67,469  4,498  0.22  0.38
Mexico  483,737  4,987  1.57  2.69
Papua New Guinea  3.586  717  0.01  0.02
Peru  51,933  2,077  0.17  0.29
Russia  401,442  2,750  1.30  2.23
United  States  9,152,098  32,921  29.64  50.90
ASEAN  540,654  1,168  1.75  3.01  100.00  8.60
ASEAN + 3  65,283.981  3,323  20.35  34.95  100.00
APEC  17,980,103  7,129  58.23  100.00
NAFTA  10,270,733  25,360  33.26  _  1
EU  8,478,054  22,524  27.461
World  30,876,254  5,165  100.00 
1  Taiwan data from Taiwan Govemment  National Statistics. May not be directly comparable to others.
Source: World Bank's World  Development Indicators 2001
GDP, another measure of economic  size, is presented in Table 2.3 above.  GDP
tells a story that is consistent in terms of economic size and diversity with that of
previously discussed measures.  Among the ASEAN countries, Singapore's $21,236
(1999) is over 80 times that of Cambodia's  $260.  If the grouping is extended to include
all ASEAN+3 countries,  then Japan's per capita GDP  ($34,228) becomes the highest and
is about a hundred times greater than that of the newest members of ASEAN.
The difference in economic development among countries is even more apparent
if a country's share of global GDP is measured.  None of the ASEAN countries'  shares of
global GDP is greater than 0.50 percent, and in the aggregate, ASEAN's GDP is only
1.75 percent of worldwide GDP.  If China, Japan and Korea are included, the share rises
35significantly to 20 percent.  If the APEC  grouping is considered, the aggregate share
jumps to 58 percent but the range of individual country shares within the group  is
extremely wide - from a low of 0.09 percent  for Vietnam to a high of  nearly 30 percent
for the U.S.
Of course, the presence of the smaller Asian countries in a group is more
significant the smaller the grouping.  This is readily apparent in the columns showing the
percent of APEC GDP and the percent of ASEAN GDP.  In APEC, the U.S. makes up 51
percent of the group GDP, while the ASEAN countries (those that are also members of
APEC) make up only 3 percent on a combined basis.  Within ASEAN-Plus-Three  (APT),
the share of the ASEAN countries in the group's aggregate GDP rises to 8.6 percent.
Japan has by far the largest share at 69 percent while the shares of China and Korea are
only 16 percent and 6 percent, respectively.
Comparing the GDP levels of the three East Asian groupings with those of
NAFTA and the EU highlights differences in economic development more than in group
size.  In total GDP, APEC is the largest of all the regional groupings ($18 trillion or 58
percent of world GDP) reflecting,  of course, the $9 trillion GDP of the U.S.  The 20
percent  global share of ASEAN-Plus-Three,  however,  is not a great deal less than the
EU's 27 percent or even NAFTA's 33 percent.  ASEAN's  share, on the other hand, is
very small (1.75 percent) when compared to these other regions.
Another important comparison is that with the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), which is a megaregional trade arrangement (MTA)140 slated to ultimately (in
2005) include 34 countries in the Western Hemisphere.  Table S.3 in the Statistical
Appendix shows GDP and GNI of the countries included in this group.  The FTAA's
share of global GDP (1999) at 38 percent is greater  than that of ASEAN-Plus-Three  (20
percent), NAFTA (33 percent) and the EU (27 percent), although considerably  smaller
than that of APEC (58 percent).  Here again, however, the major share belongs to the
U.S., without which the FTAA's share would be only 8.5 percent compared to APEC's
considerably higher 29 percent (excluding the U.S.).  This reflects the inclusion in the
FTAA of the many developing economies in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The heterogeneity  of economic development within East Asia can also be seen in
the structure of output (GDP), which for 1999 is shown in Figure 2.1 (value added as a
percent of total GDP for agriculture,  industry and services.)  (Complete data for 1990 and
1999 are shown in Table S.4 in the Statistical Appendix.)  As might be expected,  the
newer (and lesser developed) members of ASEAN, in particular Cambodia, Lao PDR and
Myanmar,  are more reliant on agricultural production.  41  For Singapore, the Philippines,
Thailand and Vietnam, services provide the greatest contribution to output, while for
Indonesia and Malaysia,  the largest share comes from industrial production.
36Figure 2.1
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In the aggregate,  the largest contribution to output for ASEAN  is from services
(47 percent of GDP), although industry is a close second at 39 percent with most of this
being from manufacturing.  (See Figure 2.2 below and Table S.4 in the Statistical
Appendix.)  In the European Monetary Union (EMU),'42 the contribution to output from
services (71  percent of GOP) far exceeds that of industry (27 percent)  and agriculture  (2
percent).  Again, this is a reflection of the wide difference  in the overall development
levels of East Asia and Europe.
37Figure 2.2
GDP Breakdown  by Reglonal  Group -19S9
a,
70
a,~  ~  ~  - -<' 
10
20
ASEAN  ASEAN  3  EMU
Brunei  Darussalam  and Myanmar not Included.
Source: The World Bank, World Development  Indicators 2001
East Asian economies have a very high savings rate.  [See Figure 2.3 showing
Gross Domestic  Savings (GDS)  and Gross Capital Formation (GCF)  43 as a percentage of
GDP for East Asian countries.  Data for 1990 and 1999 can be found in Table S.5 in the
Statistical  Appendix.]  For 8 out of the  12 countries included in Figure 2.3, the savings
rate is above the average  (in most cases well above) for economies of their respective
income level.'44 Also revealed in this figure is that most of these countries have  a surplus
of savings over investment.  With few exceptions,  the ratio of GDS to GCF is over  100
percent, which is near the average for high-income  countries.' 45 Although the overall
savings  rate for the region is very high, rates for individual countries vary considerably;
e.g., Cambodia's savings rate (GDS/GDP)  is only 5 percent and Singapore's  is over 50
percent,  a difference  of 45 percentage  points.
38Figure 2.3
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Investment rates (GCF/GDP)  are somewhat more consistent than savings rates
among individual economies  - generally  in the range of 20 to 30 percent (except for
Cambodia  and Myanrmar).  China's rate  is remarkable at 37 percent, the highest among
the countries  included in Figure 2.3.  While it can finance  its current  (1999) level of
investnent with domestic savings, it does not have a large  savings  surplus, as do
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia.  For a poorer economy,  even a high
savings rate has little impact as it can raise only small amounts  for investment so that
these economies need to rely on other sources of funds, including development
assistance. 1 46
East Asia's savings and investment rates are higher than those of other regions, as
shown in Figure 2.4.  In particular, ASEAN's  savings rate of 35 percent is nearly double
that of NAFTA and one and a half times that of the EMIU.  Of course, this is not
surprising  given the low savings rates  in western countries; for example  18 percent
(GDS/GDP) in the U.S. (1999) and  16 percent in the U.K.  The investment rate for
ASEAN  is more in line with that of NAFTA  and the EMNU but the rate for ASEAN+3  (28
percent)  is pushed up by the inclusion of China in this grouping.
39Figure 2.4
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An Open and  Globally Integrated Region
Both trade and FDI have been significantly liberalized  in what the World Bank
refers to as the "third wave of integration (or globalization)" beginning in the 1980s and
progressing  since then by virtue of transportation and communications technology,
declining tariffs and lower barriers to FDI. 1
47 The effect of this globalization on East
Asia is evident in the data presented below.
Trade expansion is an indication of the level of openness of an economy
measured by the ratio of its total trade (imports and exports) to GDP.  (See Table 2.4.)
40Table 2.4
Integration with the Global Economy
Trade  In  Goods'  Gross Private Capital Flows
2 Gross FDI3
%ofGDP  %ofGDP  %ofGDP
1990  2000  1990  2000  1990  2000
Cambodia  22.4  40.2  3.2  6.8  1.7  3.9
Indonesia  41.5  62.4  4.1  8.5  1.0  4.2
Lao PDR  32.3  52.7  3.7  8.7  0.7  5.4
Malaysia  133.3  201.3  10.3  16.8  5.3  2.0
Philippines  47.6  98.5  4.4  48.4  1.2  2.8
Singapore  309.9  295.3  54.6  48.5  20.7  11.6
Thailand  66.1  107.2  13.  11.3  3.0  2.8
Vietnam  79.7  96.0  n.a  10.8  n.a.  4.1
China  32.5  43.9  2.5  12.7  1.2  4.3
Hong Kong, China  223.5  256.2  n.a.  188.8  n.a.  89.2
Japan  17.1  17.7  5.4  10.3  1.7  0.9
Korea  53.4  72.8  6.2  11.5  0.7  3.2
Canada  43.8  75.8  8.1  30.0  2.7  16.1
Mexico  32.1  60.8  9.2  6.3  1.0  2.3
United States  15.8  20.7  5.7,  16.9  2.8  5.1
East Asia &  Pacific  48.8  65.6  5.3  13.3  1.5  3.9
Europe EMU  44.9  56.3  14.1  49.31  2.9  14.8
1. The sum of merchandise exports and imports measured in current U.S. dollars,  divided by the value of GDP
in U.S. dollars.
2.  The sum of the absolute values cf direct, portfolio, and other investment inflows and outflows  recorded in the
balance of payments financial accoLnt,  excluding changes in  the assets and liabilities of monetary authorities
and general  govemment.
3. The sum of absolute values of inilows and outflows of FDI recorded in  the balance of payments financial account.
This indicator differs from the standard measure of FDI, which captures  only inward investment
Note:  Data not available for Brunei Darussalam,  Myanmar, and Taiwan; data for some countries may be
for a  year different than  indicated.
Source:  The World Bank, Worid Demelopment Indicators  2002, Table 6.1, pp 332-334.
The East Asia and Pacific region has a considerably higher trade/GDP  ratio (66 percent in
2000) than that of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and NAFTA (i.e., Mexico, the
U.S. and Canada shown separately in the above table).  There is a significant difference
in the level of this ratio almong the individual East Asian economies with Singapore and
Hong Kong at the higher end, reflecting their roles as entrepots,  and China and the
smaller ASEAN countries  at the lower end, reflecting the slower opening of their
economies.
Another important indicator of the degree of openness in trade is the import
tariff, 1
48 which has been r  educed significantly over the last decade largely due to the
effects of regional and global trade arrangements.  (See Figure 2.5 below.)
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In the early 1990s, import tariffs for East Asian economi  were much higher
than those in NAFTA and the EU reflecting the region's developing-country  status' 
50 and
the EU and NAFTA'sl51 earlier trade liberalization. 1 52 By 2000, however,  average  tariffs
in East Asia had declined sharply, particularly  in the ASEAN  countries 1"  partly due to
progress under AFTA and APEC's Bogor Declaration.  As a result of China's
preparations  for WTO accession,  its average tariff dropped  from 41 percent in 1992 to
16.3 percent  in 2000 in all products (primary and manufactured.)
The level of private capital  flows into a country indicates  the strength of its
investment climate and reflects the degree of liberalization of its financial markets.  As
seen in Table 1, this level as a percent of GDP for East Asia remains quite low (13.3
percent) compared to, for example, 49 percent for the EMU.  This reflects the effect of
the crisis and East Asia's comparatively  lesser developed financial markets.
The most significant  capital flows for developing countries,  including East Asia,
are foreign direct investment flows.  But even these were very small (3.9 percent of GDP)
for East Asia and the Pacific  in 2000.  However, in 2001,  the Asia-Pacific region
introduced the largest number of changes in FDI regimes designed to create a more
favorable investment climate to attract more FDI.  Out of 194 such favorable regulatory
changes made worldwide, the region's share was 43 percent.154
East Asia's liberalized trade and FDI were instrumental in the region's growth in
the 1  980s and early 1  990s.  During that time, East Asia had opened up to other types of
42private capital flows (non-FDI), which eventually led to the 1997-98 crisis as countries in
the region were ill-prepared to cope with the volatility of these types of flows.  The crisis
brought to an abrupt end the earlier burst of super growth, discouraged  foreign
investment, and caused countries in the region to become wary of such investment.  Yet
the importance  to econornic  growth of remaining open to trade and FDI is well
recognized by the region's economies.
Concluding Remarks
A look at East Assia's social, economic  and political structures reveals a region of
enormous  diversity, particularly when compared with other regions of the world.  While
this undoubtedly presents  challenges for regional cooperation in East Asia, it does not
preclude it.  As Tay and  Estanislao  (2000) point out, "diversity and cooperation are not,
of course, opposites."'55  They go on to explain that if cooperation among countries  is to
succeed,  it is more impoitant that they have "central policies and directions that all agree
on" than that they be identical.  This, of course, raises the question of how East Asian
economies  should proceed  in cultivating these "central policies and directions".
Volumes of data and extensive analysis are not needed to show that Japan, for
example,  is a large developed economy and Lao PDR is a small developing economy and
the two must, therefore,  follow widely divergent paths to achieve  economic growth over
the next decade.  However, the analysis in this chapter goes beyond that to present a
picture of the major regional groupings  within East Asia comparing them to one another
and to other regional groups globally across various indicators.  From this analysis,
several questions come to mind.
What level of economic diversity in a regional  grouping would maximize the
benefits of cooperation for the economies of East Asia?  An economy the size and
developmental  status of (Cambodia (GDP of $3 billion) or Lao PDR (GDP of $1 billion),
for example, could be dwarfed by the economic power of a developed country such as
Japan (GDP of $4 trillion)  or the U.S. (GDP of $9 trillion), or by the huge potential of
China with its enormous  population of 1.3 billion people and GDP of $989 billion, which
is at the same time a potential market and a cheap  labor source.
Is it reasonable to expect that the interests and economic well being of a small
developing economy in Asia would receive the same consideration as that of a highly
developed western economy if both were members of the same regional group, such as
APEC?  Is a single regional institution the only possibility or could multiple groups
comprising different but sometimes  overlapping memberships serve some purpose, at
least initially?
As a group, how would ASEAN, which has only a  1.75 percent share of world
GDP, fare in competition with the EU and NAFTA,  which have 27 and 33 percent shares,
respectively?  Would a group such as ASEAN-Plus-Three,  with a 20 percent share of
world GDP, fare better?  And, of course, APEC would be even larger and more
competitive, but it is perceived by some countries as not being strictly "Asian" and,
therefore, not fulfilling the requirements  of a true regional forum.
It can be argued that a group comprising  developmentally similar economies
would be a more workable  arrangement in which smaller members would have more
influence, but perhaps more compelling  is the argument in favor of agreements between
industrial and developing economies in that they can bring significant benefits to the
43developing partners in the form of enlarged export markets, accelerated FDI, and
technology transfer. 1
5 6 While an East-West regional grouping is one possible type of
industrial  country-developing  country arrangement,  a North-South regional arrangement
might be more beneficial and feasible  as it would involve shared history, culture, and
long-established trade relationships.  Given the degree of openness and global integration
of East Asia as a whole,  one might even ask whether a regional arrangement  is necessary
or desirable at all, or whether multilateralism is preferable.
Chapter II raises more questions than it answers but does inform the discussion of
how to pursue regional integration in East Asia.  The following chapters will bring
greater clarification to this issue through an examination  of East Asia's regional
institutions, trade and FDI, financial  systems, and monetary regimes.
44Chapter  III - Re(gional  Institutions in East Asia
In the second half of  the  20 th century, regionalism in East Asia became more
purposeful and structured  as regional institutions (e.g., ASEAN and APEC) were
established.  This was prompted by the departure of colonialism  from the region.  In this
environment, Asian nations were faced with the necessity of taking charge of their own
economic development and solving their own political and security problems.
While there is ample evidence that Asian nations have engaged in intraregional
trade for many centuries,  this is not to say that Asia has followed a well-defined  or
purposeful strategy toward regional economic integration.  Centuries ago, Asia's
intraregional trade was driven by geographical proximity and the desire for profit.  In the
20th century, regional cooperation took a more deliberate turn but the motivation behind it
was more political than economic.  Nevertheless, in the last ten years or so, economic and
monetary cooperation within East Asia has made some progress.  There is developing a
strong desire, if not quite to the extent of complete  commitment, to further regional
cooperation among East Asian nations.
This chapter looks at regionalism in East Asia from the perspective of the region's
institutions.  Regional institutions have been slow to develop in East Asia and in fact are
still evolving.  As cooperation among the nations of the region becomes a higher priority,
attention is increasingly  directed toward forming the type of institution that would best
serve the interests  of the region and the individual countries  therein.  There are several
regional groupings that currently represent the region in one respect or another, the most
prominent of which are ASEAN (and its extensions) and APEC.  This review will cover
the motivation for the fonnation of these institutions,  as well as their objectives and
achievements.
East Asia's efforts  to formalize regional cooperation into a workable  arrangement
for the promotion of trade, investment and security in the region have been varied but,
until recently, not extensive.  These efforts have been complicated by (1) the
heterogeneity  in many aspects of the region,  (2) historical political tensions between
certain countries,  (3) the clesire to protect national interests and specific industries (e.g.,
agriculture  and automobiles), and (4) Asia's already established openness in trade and
FDI and its long-standing relationships with the U.S.  and the EU.  This has led to the
formation of a number of regional cooperative  arrangements.
The most prominent of these institutions today are the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN)  and Asia-Pacific Economic  Cooperation (APEC).  Some others
that are perhaps less well known but currently operative  are Asia-Europe Meeting
(ASEM),  Bangkok Agreement,  and Australia-New  Zealand Closer Economic Relations
Trade Agreement  (CER).  There have,  however, been other groups comprising East
Asian nations, as well as countries outside  the region, that no longer exist but that are
relevant to the formation and development of currently existing institutions.  Some of
these are described in Table 3.1  below:
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Earl  Efforts at Regional Cooperation
Institution  Dates of  Purpose
Existence
Southeast Asian Treaty  1954-1977  Started by the U.S. as part of its
Organization (SEATO)  global anti-communist military and
security alliance.  Dominated by the
West with only the Philippines and
Thailand from SE Asia.  Ended when
_  U.S. withdrew from Vietnam.
Asian and Pacific  Council  1966-1973  Initiated by South Korea as a multi-
(ASPAC)  regional  organization against
communism  for security purposes and
future cooperation.  Includes only
Malaysia,  the Philippines,  South
Vietnam and Thailand from SE Asia.
Indonesia refused to join.  Dissolved
in 1973.
Association of Southeast  1961-1963  First attempt by SE Asian nations at
Asia (ASA)  regional cooperation initiated by
Malaya and including the Philippines
and Thailand as well. Purpose was
economic and cultural cooperation.
Dissolved when the Federation of
Malaysia was formed among Malaya,
Sabah (North Borneo),  Sarawak and
Singapore.  Brunei declined to join for
fear of losing its oil revenues and
because of leadership issues. The
Philippines refused to recognize it
because of its own claims on Sabah,
and President Sukarno of Indonesia
strongly objected to a Federation of
Malaysia.
MAPHILINDO  July - Sept.  1963  Rival of ASA including Malaya,
Philippines  and Indonesia to promote
economic, military, cultural and
social cooperation. Focused on
welfare of Melayu region so not
supported by non-Malay members.
Ended when Federation of Malaysia
formed.
Source: Tongzon  (1998:  3-4)
46The success of these early groups was jeopardized by territorial disputes, the
preference  for nationalism over regionalism,  racial tensions, ideological animosity,  and
mutual distrust.  There was obviously a need for a regional grouping that would serve to
unify Southeast Asian nations to deal with divisive issues and political tensions in the
face of (1) the departure of the U.S. and Britain, which left a power vacuum in the
region, and the closing of foreign military bases, (2) the rise of communism,  (3) the
increasing economic strength of Japan, and (4) various regional disputes among
themselves.
ASEAN
In August 1967,  Indonesia, Malaysia,  the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand
signed the Bangkok Declaration thus forming the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN). 1'7  Although ASEAN was officially open to all Southeast Asian nations from
the very beginning, no other country joined until 1984 when membership  began to
expand with the admission of Brunei Darussalam.  Thereafter, Vietnam joined in 1995,
Lao PDR and Myanmar  in 1997, and Cambodia  in 1999.
The first of seven aims and purposes of ASEAN as stated in the Bangkok
Declaration is "to accelerate  the economic  growth, social progress and cultural
development in the region [  ].  158  (The other six aims are similar in context.)
Nonetheless,  it is widely acknowledged that the main impetus for ASEAN's formation
was political.'59 In fact, it fulfilled quite well the political needs at the time of all
ASEAN members; e.g.,  it facilitated the restoration of amicable  relations between
Malaysia and Indonesia, f-ostered the alliance between Thailand  (which was on the front
line of the Vietnam war) and other non-communist members, provided  a forum for
possible resolution of the Philippines'  North Borneo (Sabah) claim, and ensured
Singapore's continued existence  as an independent  state.'60
ASEAN has contributed significantly to stability in the region.  Chia (1997)
attributes ASEAN's political success to the "ASEAN  style of conducting regional
relations,  emphasising  the principles of accommodation  and consensus  in decision
making  and non-interference  in the domestic  affairs of its members, and accommodating
the needs of members at different levels of economic development."'61  She goes on to
acknowledge, however, that this "consensus building" has inhibited, rather than
promoted, economic cooperation within ASEAN.
Southeast Asian nations had thus recognized that the political environment in the
region was changing significantly and moved to align themselves so as to deal with it in a
unified manner that would at the same time preserve their national interests.  They also
perceived the potential benefits of being aligned economically but, although this was
included as a goal in the founding document, their economic plan was less clear and the
outcome less successful  thian it was for their political aims.
ASEAN remained  a primarily political organization for nearly ten years.  Only in
1976, at the Bali Summit did it begin to focus  on economic cooperation with the signing
of the Declaration of ASE,AN Concord.  In addition to programs for action in the
political, social,  cultural and security areas,  it devoted considerable  attention to
cooperative actions related to production and export of basic commodities (food and
energy), industrial projects, and trade.  The last of these (trade) included a provision  for
47the eventual"  [.  . establishment of preferential trading arrangements as a long term
objective [. .]..,6
According to Tan (2000), the economic rationale for ASEAN lies in the eventual
establishment of a free trade area similar to the customs union established by the
European Economic Community (EEC).  Mention of a common market as a goal
occurred as early as  1971 at the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.  However,  Hadi
Soesastro emphasizes: "The founding fathers of ASEAN made it clear that regional
economic integration is not the objective of ASEAN."163 This is supported by Simon SC
Tay's assertion that ASEAN has expressly distanced itself from "any idea of integration,
such as in the European Union."'64  While ASEAN spoke of regional economic
"cooperation"  it never mentioned regional economic "integration".  It was formally
mentioned for the first time in the Hanoi Plan of Action (December  1998).165
In order to fulfill its stated objective of economic cooperation,  ASEAN attempted
to implement a number of economic initiatives (most of which were industrial
cooperation initiatives).  Through industrial cooperation ASEAN aspired to facilitate
economic cooperation by developing regionwide industrial capacity as an alternative to
national industrialization.  While on a national scale individual ASEAN economies have
small markets and limited skilled labor, on a regional scale the ASEAN market comprises
around 500 million people.
The early (through 1988)  economic plans initiated by ASEAN are described in
Table 3.2.  These early initiatives were considered extremely ineffective.  Later economic
initiatives,  such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area, have more substance but have some
inherent structural problems.
Table 3.2
Early ASEAN  Economic Initiatives
Initiative  Purpose  Degree of Success
ASEAN Industrial Projects  Established large-scale industrial  Limited success because:
(AEP)  projects utilizing raw materials from  *  Planned in haste resulting in
1976  members and producing for the regional  choice of unprofitable
market.  projects.
*  Required consensus
decisionmaking that led to








*  Lack of national commitment
to market sharing.
*  Decentralized ASEAN
bureaucracy hampered
implementation.
Preferential Trading  Provided for preferential tariff rates [or  Implementation  was weak
Arrangement  (PTA)  margin of preferences (MOP)] on basic  because:
1977  commodities - reduced most-favored-  *  Many important products
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Initiative  Purpose  Degree of Success
nation tariff rates.  with high trade values were
excluded.
*  Countries offered irrelevant
items such as snowplows or
products not produced in any
other ASEAN country.
*  High degree of similarity in
items offered.
*  Most items offered were not
major imports of member
countries.
*  Verification process was
costly and made the scheme
unattractive  to the business
community."
*  Narrow commodity coverage
and small margins of
preference.
ASEAN Industrial  Improved version of AIP. Scheme  Unsuccessful  because:
Complementation  (AIC)  through which member countries were  *  Only one project (automobile
1981  allocated  complementary products in  components)  was approved.
specific  sectors for production  and  *  Similar problems to those of
preferential  trade among members.  AIP including long
Promoted  import-substitution  bureaucratic  procedure.  Was
industrialization.  The concept was to  supposed to increase private
pursue joint production of an ASEAN  sector involvement but failed
car by sharing production of various  to do so because planning
auto parts among countries.  and implementation
guidelines drawn up without
private  sector input.
*  Allocation of products to
members  hampered by
universal preference  for high
value-added  components.
*  Thus each country, except
Singapore, developed its own
automobile industry with
participation  of MNCs.
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Initiative  Purpose  Degree  of Success
A private  sector version of AlPs. Same  Very few projects that were
ASEAN Industrial Joint  privileges  as enjoyed under AIPs but  proposed  were ever implemented.
Venture (AIJV)  has more flexibility.  Investors can  Most had foreign equity
1983  locate projects in any participating  participation  and few were
country. Open to non-ASEAN nations  ASEAN-wide  in coverage.
as long as majority ownership  by at  Reasons  for lack of success:
least one member. Emphasis on equity  *  Delays due to bureaucratic
and market sharing,  unlike AIC's  processes.
reciprocity.  *  Members unwilling to
participate in joint ventures
with preferential  tariffs
because of threat to own
industries.
*  Members unwilling to import
products of projects unless
own products were imported
by other members.
The Brand-to-Brand  Replaced  AIC.  Similar to the AIC  ASEAN countries tried to protect
Complementation  (BBC)  scheme except that BBC encourages  their own strategic industries  and
1988  economies of scale  in automotive  economic interests and placed a
production  through exchange of  ban or considerable impediments
component parts for specified brands.  upon the importation  of
At this point, ASEAN economic  completed vehicles.  Indonesia did
strategy  completely shifted from import  not even participate  in BBC
substitution  to export promotion with  scheme until  1995.
foreign capital investment.
Sources:  Tongzon (1998:  59-65), Thongpakde (2001:  50), and Tan (2000: 249-257).
This industrial-type cooperative  effort (which is a different approach from the
PTA effort, also included in the above table) would involve resource pooling and market
sharing and, thus, would allow ASEAN economies  to take advantage of economies  of
scale and a large combined market.  These schemes would enable individual countries to
specialize in manufacturing  specific components  as a means of developing large-scale
industries  (e.g., automobiles).  This should increase complementarity among regional
economies  and eventually increase  intraregional trade and investment.  Finally, industrial
cooperation would shift the focus of industrialization from a national level to a regional
level.  As regional  industrialization grows, regional cooperation  should increase  leading
to further industrialization and so on. 167
Theoretically,  this plan should have worked, but in reality it did not.  As outlined
in the above table, the various industrial cooperative  efforts were largely unsuccessful
due to problems  related to implementation, financing,  and private sector involvement.
ASEAN's early attempts at economic cooperation  did not contribute to the remarkable
economic performance of the ASEAN countries at the time.  This was rather the result of
ASEAN's trade and investment  links with the rest of the world.
While ASEAN's early initiatives were rather ad hoc and piecemeal, they did give
ASEAN members an introduction to economic cooperation.  The next step was to embark
on the path to forming a free trade area.
50ASEAN Free  Trade Area  (AFTA)
As revealed in the foregoing discussion, ASEAN was largely unsuccessful in its
early attempts at economic cooperation.  Therefore,  it perceived  itself to be in a
disadvantageous  positioni in the early 1990s when the world was experiencing a surge in
regionalism, which eventually culminated in the formation of the following: 168
*  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation's  (APEC) Free Trade Area (FTA) - 1989
*  North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) - 1994
*  European Union (EU) - 1995
*  MERCOSUR.  - 1991
*  Others - 87 (out of a total of 194) agreements were notified to the
GATT/WTO in the 1990s, including the aforementioned.'6 9
This deepening and widening of trade blocs in North America and Europe caused
ASEAN concern that its exports would face restricted access to the large markets of the
EU and NAFTA.  Additionally,  investment funds from these two areas could be diverted
away from ASEAN countries to their respective intraregional members.  At the same
time, there was considerable uncertainty  as to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of
the GATT which was stalled at the time.  Although ASEAN initially resisted joining
broader regional fora, it did eventually agree to join APEC, reflecting  a dawning
realization that ASEAN was too narrow to succeed in an environment of increasing
globalization.  By that time, it also felt sufficiently consolidated  so as not to be
swallowed up by a larger APEC'70 but, on the other hand, felt the need to speed up the
formation of AFTA to further ensure ASEAN's role in the region and the world.  l7
ASEAN's response to this environment of increasing regionalism  and an
uncertain multilateral trading system was to create the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
in 1992.  AFTA initially was conceived as a regional tariff reduction program to be
carried out in phases through 2008 (later moved forward to 2003).  Subsequently, this
program was gradually broadened to include other activities  consisting of customs
initiatives including harrmonization of standards, an industrial cooperation scheme
(AICO), a framework agreement for the intraregional liberalization of trade in services,
and the endorsement in principle of the concept of an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA).
The AFTA agreement was originally signed by six members (Brunei, Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,  and Thailand) with Vietnam joining in 1995, Lao
PDR and Myanmar in  1  997, and Cambodia in 1999.
The framework  for AFTA's reduction of tariffs on goods traded within ASEAN
(that meet a 40 percent ASEAN content requirement)  is the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT), which originally stipulated that tariffs on all manufactured
and processed agricultural products would be reduced to 0-5 percent within  15 years.
However, with the completion of the Uruguay Round and APEC's formation of an FTA
over the next two years, ASEAN decided in 1994 to shorten the timeframe to  10 years so
that AFTA's goals would be achieved by 2003.172  This deadline was for the ASEAN6
and was later changed to 2002 for all but a few products.  The deadline for Vietnam is
2006, for Lao PDR and Myanmar  it is 2008 and for Cambodia it is 2010.
The CEPT schemre contains four lists: the Inclusion List (IL), the Temporary
Exclusion List (TEL), the Sensitive List (SL), and the General Exceptions List (GEL).
The IL has two schedules - the normal track and the fast track.  Tariffs for items on the
normal track must be reduced to 0-5 percent by 2002, or 2003 for a small number of
51products.  Fast track goods were to have their tariffs reduced to the same level by 2000.
By 2003, the average CEPT tariff rate for products in the IL will be about 2.7  percent,
compared to  12.76 percent in  1993 when the reduction program was initiated.  Average
CEPT tariff rates for the years from 1998 to 2003 are shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3
Average CEPT Tariff Rates
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003
Bruneil  1.35  1.29  1.00  0.97  0.94  0.87
Indonesia  7.04  5.85  4.97  4.63  4.20  3.71
Lao PDR  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00
Malaysia  3.58  3.17  2.73  2.54  2.38  2.06
Myanmar  4.47  4.45  4.38  3.32  3.31  3.19
Philippines  7.96  7.00  5.59  5.07  4.80  3.75
Singapore  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Thailand  10.56  9.75  7.40  7.36  6.02  4.64
Vietnam  6.06  3.78  3.30  2.90  2.89  2.02
ASEAN  _  5.37  4.77  3.87  3.65  3.25  2.68
NOTE:  Cambodia  not included in  original table.
Source:  ASEAN Secretariat as cited at <http:llwww.us-asean.org/afta.htm>
Products can be excluded from the CEPT by placing them on one of the other
three lists.  The TEL is for items for which tariffs will eventually be reduced to 0-5
percent but are temporarily protected by delaying the reduction.  Items on the SL are
unprocessed agricultural products, which were  added to the CEPT in 1994 and are due
for tariff reduction by 2010.  The addition of these products was considered a very
important step,  as it was an indication of liberalization in the area of agricultural trade,
nearly always difficult to accomplish.  Only the GEL items (which satisfy Article XX of
the GATT) may be permanently  excluded from tariff reductions for very specific reasons.
The 2001 package of tariff cuts under the CEPT includes 55,680 tariff lines in the
IL (84.7 percent of total tariff lines),  8,660 lines in the TEL (13.4 percent of total), 829
lines in the GEL (1.3 percent of total), and 360 lines in the SL (0.6 percent of total).  The
long-term  goal of ASEAN is to have zero tariff rates on nearly all imports by 2010 for the
original signatories,  and by 2015 for the four newer members. 74
AFTA's CEPT scheme is  considered a significant improvement over ASEAN's
earlier PTAs.  For example,  in the CEPT, concessions  are granted on a reciprocal
product-by-product  basis, meaning that a member country can receive concessions from
partners only for items the country itself is liberalizing.  Members are thus encouraged to
maximize  the number of tariff lines in their liberalization schemes. 1
75
The PTAs were open-ended (no timeframe), the choice of preference  items was
voluntary with the designation of "sensitive" items left up to individual countries, and the
reduction of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), although included, was not rigorously pursued.
Contrarily, the CEPT has a definite timeframe  for completion, SL and GEL items are
subject to specific definitions and restrictions, and countries must eliminate all
52quantitative restrictions on products for which they receive concessions  and eliminate
other NTBs on products within five years after receiving concessions on them.
Another problem with the earlier PTAs was the practice of "padding inclusion
lists."  To prevent this, the CEPT products are defined on a sectoral basis but exclusions
from the CEPT are defined at a more disaggregated level.176 The question remains,
however, whether AFTA will actually result in benefits accruing to the ASEAN member
countries.
The potential benefits of AFTA have been assessed in several studies using a
Computable General  Equilibrium model (CGE).1 77 A study by DeRosa (1995) used the
model to deterrnine the effects of AFTA on the original five ASEAN countries; i.e.,
Indonesia, Malaysia,  the Philippines,  Singapore, and Thailand.  (Brunei was a member of
ASEAN at the time of the study but DeRosa did not include it because of its small size
and poor data records.)  The simulation results for trade are shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1
Effects of AFTA and  MFN  Liberalization  on ASEAN
Trade
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The figure shows that trade creation does occur under AFTA - at about the same
level for both "trade within ASEAN"  (by $2.9 billion, or 19 percent) and "ASEAN trade
with the world" (by $2.4 billion).  However, under the MFN liberalization scenario, trade
creation within ASEAN is somewhat smaller ($1.7 billion) and trade with the world is
much greater ($9.1  billion) than under the AFTA scenario.  The enormous difference
between the two scenarios  in creation of trade with the world is attributed to the
exploitation of the "wider differences  in the sources of international  comparative
advantage between the ASEAN countries and their international trading partners,
especially the major industrial countries."
178 As for agriculture,  Indonesia, Malaysia,
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nearly as much as under MFN liberalization.
The simulation also shows that the expansion of production and exports in various
economic  sectors is about the same under the AFTA and MFN liberalization  scenarios.
However, improvements to economic welfare (real expenditures on final demand, or real
absorption)  are much smaller for most countries under AFTA than under MFN
liberalization.  Only Singapore and (Malaysia to a lesser extent) show improved
economic welfare under AFTA because of their relatively open economies, which would
bring benefits to them from the creation of new trade and the diversion of trade away
from the rest of the world.
Overall, the DeRosa (1995) study (supported by a 1996 study by Lewis and
Robinson) finds that an MFN liberalization scenario yields significantly larger gains in
trade and economic welfare than does an AFTA scenario  for ASEAN5.
A recent study by Fukase and Martin (2001) assesses the effect of AFTA on the
new ASEAN countries (Cambodia,  Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam) also using a CGE
model.'79 The authors look at benefits/costs on an AFTA-only basis and on an extended
MFN liberalization basis.  The authors decompose  the sources of welfare change into (1)
welfare  gains from trade creation, (2) welfare losses from trade diversion, and (3) welfare
gains from terms-of-trade  improvements  in a country's exports.  Simultaneous  changes in
these three components determine the net effect of AFTA.  80 The findings of this study
are summarized in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4
Impact of AFTA on ASEAN  New  Member Countries
ASEAN  Member Country  Overall Effect  Major Specific  Effects
Cambodia  Somewhat beneficial  Trade diversion offsets benefits
of trade creation. Terms-of-trade
gains from improved access to
partner markets  are limited. Entry
into AFTA important in
stimulating development of new
revenue sources,  such as VAT.
Lao PDR  Economically beneficial  Import side: Trade creating, thus
reflecting high share of ASEAN
countries in Lao PDR's imports
and slightly higher initial tariff
rates  levied on ASEAN goods.
Export side: Positive effects  on
most important export
commodities (wood products  to
ASEAN and garments to EU).
AFTA also reduces vulnerability
to shocks related to small number
of exports, so likely to stimulate
exports in processed  foods,
animal products and some labor-
intensive  industries.
Myanmar  Economically beneficial  Gains from trade creation  (from
tariff reductions)  only partially
offset by costs of trade diversion
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ASEAN Member Country  Overall Effect  Major Specific  Effects
(from reductions in imports from
partner countries).  However,
gains are small because
Myanmar's tariff rates already
low. Most gains are from
improved terms-of-trade from
tariff cuts in partner countries.
Vietnam  Somewhat beneficial  Benefit is small because
Vietnam's share of trade with
ASEAN is initially  small.  Also,
gains from improved access to
partner markets limited because
exports to ASEAN  are via
Singapore where protection  is
nearly zero. AFTA benefits
agricultural sector through better
._______________  access to ASEAN markets.
Source: Fukase and Martin (2001)
Overall, the simulation results for the new member countries  in Fukase and
Martin (2001) are consistent with those for the ASEAN5 countries in DeRosa (1995) and
in Lewis and Robinson (1996).  All new member countries are positively affected by
AFTA, although the effects are relatively small.  Also in line with DeRosa's findings,
Fukase and Martin report that benefits increase if AFTA commitments are extended on a
non-discriminatory basis (MFN liberalization),  which implies that "AFTA may be used
as a useful stepping ston.e to further liberalization because it exposes domestic industry to
greater competition, and creates a situation where there are substantial benefits from
reducing the trade diversion associated with discriminatory liberalization."' 81 The
simulation shows that Vietnam especially stands to benefit in this way implying "that the
sectoral protection currently given to capital-intensive  and 'strategic'  industries is costing
Vietnam's economy as a whole, imposing substantial implicit taxes on the rest of the
economy."'
8 2
The above quantitative analyses address the static  benefits  and costs of
membership in AFTA.  [t is equally, if not more, important to examine the dynamic
effects of an RTA.  This would involve the assessment of any factor that would impact
the economic growth rate of a member country over the medium- to long-termn.  While
current literature does not support a theory that RTAs always lead to dynamic gains for
developing countries,1 83 the possibility that dynamic effects of regional integration might
contribute to growth through AFTA is examined by Fukase and Martin (2001).  The
authors determine the degree of convergence  (in this case, narrowing of the difference
between national per capita income over time)1 84 as the means to assess this growth.  As
far as developed countries are concerned,  there exists some strong evidence  that an RTA
increases  trade between  members leading to the convergence of per capita incomes across
countries.  The EC, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA),  and the U.S. and
Canada are cited as exarmples  of regional  groupings that experienced this after signing
RTAs.'  85 However, there is little work in this area related to developing countries.
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they look at three possibilities through which dynamic effects of regional integration
could contribute to growth for ASEAN members:  (1)  productivity growth through the
accumulation of knowledge,  (2) accumulation of physical and human capital, and (3)
accelerated domestic reforms.  Growth depends  on changes  in these variables  and their
rates of change can be affected by regional integration.  While the authors find little
direct correlation between regional integration and growth, they do find the possibility of
an indirect effect through the accumulation of knowledge  or of factors of production
(physical and human capital), which in turn would lead to increased growth.  They
caution, however,  that it is important to be "open to" the countries that have these things
to begin with.  In other words, it is possible that if a member of a regional group is open
to an extra-group  country having large "stocks of knowledge" but then switches to
dealing instead with an intra-group country having lower stocks, this could have negative
effects  on a country's productivity level and, hence, its rate of growth.
In summary, it appears from the above assessment that AFTA would bring
welfare gains to its members;  however, the effect on non-members  in the region needs to
be examined as well.  It is possible that a wider grouping would bring even more benefits
to members.
Other ASEAN Activities
While AFTA's primary activities relate to its tariff reduction program, it is
engaged in other programs for intraregional  cooperation.  Some major programs include
the following.
ASEAN Industrial Cooperation Scheme  (AICO)  - This program,  initiated in
1996, replaced ASEAN's earlier unsuccessful industrial cooperation plans.  AICO  is
designed to attract technology-based  investments and is open to any company that is
incorporated and operating in an ASEAN country and has a minimum of 30 percent
ASEAN equity.  It must also be engaged in resource sharing in areas such as technology,
markets or raw material purchases.  AICO proposes  to attract investments by establishing
simpler and faster approval procedures, offering the 0-5 percent AFTA tariff scheme  and
removing non-tariff barriers.  However,  the non-tariff incentives are to be determined by
each country and have not been specified.  Products must have ASEAN content of at least
40 percent and each project must have a minimum of two companies  in two ASEAN
countries.  Although not much information is available on the success of AICO, there
were  at least 90 approved AICO applications as of April 2002.  Thailand is involved in
over half of the projects (two countries per project) while Indonesia, Malaysia and the
Philippines  are also heavily involved.  Singapore and Vietnam are members of just a few
projects.  Most of the projects  are in the automotive industry with a few in electronics,
food processing, and others. 1
86
Service  Liberalization - In  1995, ASEAN adopted an agreement on trade in
services.  Negotiations to liberalize  intraregional  services cover seven sectors:  financial
services, tourism, telecommunications,  maritime transport,  air transport,  construction and
business services.  ASEAN members must comply with the principles of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to eliminate all market access limitations.
ASEAN is trying to set a higher standard than provided for in the WTO's GATS.  (Lao
PDR, Myanmar and Cambodia are not WTO members.)  So far, two rounds of
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seven sectors with agreements from the first round having already been implemented.  A
third round of negotiations is scheduled to begin in 2002 and be completed in 2004.
ASEAN  Investment Area (AIA) - The Framework Agreement on the ASEAN
Investment Area was signed in October 1998 in Manila.  Manufacturing,  fisheries,
mining, agriculture and forestry sectors are to eventually be covered by the AIA.  The
agreement calls for the irmmediate opening up of all industries for investment and the
granting of national treatment, with some exceptions,  to ASEAN investors by 2010 and
to all investors by 2020.  Some exceptions may be specified in a Temporary Exclusion
List (TEL) and a Sensitive List (SL).  The goal is to phase out the TEL for the
manufacturing  sector by 2003, except for Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam, which will
have until 2010 for the phase-out.
ASEAN Extensions - ASEAN  Plus Three
ASEAN has in recent years explored the possibility of expansion to include other
East Asian countries.  An. early attempt was made in  1990 when Malaysia's  Prime
Minister Mahathir proposed the formation of an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG)
including ASEAN6, China, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong,  and Taiwan.  The proposal was
changed into a caucus that was to function within APEC and the name was changed to
the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC).  The caucus was not enthusiastically received
in Asia, and was vehemently rejected by the U.S., which believed a broader forum like
APEC would bring more benefits to the region.  The caucus has therefore remained
behind the scenes.
ASEAN Plus Three (APT) is probably the best known of the ASEAN extensions
and comprises ASEAN members plus the Northeast Asian countries of China, Japan and
Korea.  It is an informal group whose formation was motivated by the East Asian crisis.
It does not have its own secretariat but meets at the invitation of ASEAN.  The first
meeting of the group occurred in December  1997.  The APT process has been driven by
ASEAN; however, the Plus-Three countries have played a major role in influencing its
agenda.  The group's activities have expanded  so they now include meetings of finance,
economic, and foreign ministers, as well as of national leaders.
To date, APT's contribution to regional cooperation has been in the
monetary/financial  area, particularly through its efforts related to the Chiang Mai
Initiative.  There are signs recently, however,  that APT is beginning to be viewed as more
than a monetary forum.  Recent literature and media reports allude to the possibility of
APT becoming a more formalized group and even that it could be instrumental in the
formation of an East Asian bloc.  The advantage of this particular group, of course, is that
it includes countries of both Northeast and Southeast Asia, bringing in three of the most
powerful countries  in the region.  Of particular importance is the inclusion of China,
whose competitive potential in the region is causing  concern among ASEAN members
and, consequently,  whose cooperation is viewed as potentially valuable.  Japan's
inclusion is also seen as invaluable because of its long-standing prominence in the region
in trade and investment.  And, of course, Korea, as one of the newly industrializing
economies,  should not be excluded.
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Since the inception of ASEAN, Southeast Asia has enjoyed political stability
(with a few exceptions) and relatively long periods of economic growth (interrupted by
the  1997-98 crisis).  How much of this  is attributable  to the effectiveness of ASEAN,
however,  is unclear.  Those who credit the growth and stability of the recent past to
ASEAN emphasize the important role of  the "ASEAN Way" (consensus decisionmaking,
sensitivity to the interests of others,  and non-interference  in the internal affairs of
neighbors).  Also perceived as a contributing factor to past successes  is ASEAN's growth
strategy of "regional  integration within the global economic system."  Soesastro and
Morrison (2001) refer to these two success factors as the "ASEAN Formula".187
ASEAN's loosely knit or "soft" structure was necessary and well serving in the
past when the emphasis  was on keeping the organization together just to accomplish
anything at all.  While the "ASEAN Way" worked well at that time, the appropriateness
of ASEAN's non-interfering  and non-confrontational  style is being questioned in view of
today's complex and globalizing world.'88 ASEAN has been perceived as ineffectual and
bureaucratic,  indecisive  and unable to deal with the problems of the region (e.g., the East
Asian crisis and the haze problem in  1996-97).  It has even been criticized by its own
secretary-general, Rodolfo  Severino, who claims that ASEAN has lost direction and does
not know how to proceed beyond tariff reduction.  In his words, "Regional integration
seems to have become stuck in framework agreements,  work programs and master
plans."189  A more structured and rules-based institution is seen by some to be
necessary.'90
Many are of the opinion that ASEAN needs to go beyond its current
configuration.  ASEAN's economic cooperative  efforts have until recently been centered
on trade.  Increasing intraregional trade and investment is often a primary goal of
regionalism  and an indication of the success of a regional group.  However, Ariff (2000)
emphasizes that this is "not sufficient to bring about a greater regional economic
integration."'1 9 1
Our analysis of intraregional  trade intensity in Chapter IV will show that
intraregional trade in East Asia, although greater than that of the EU and NAFTA, has
actually declined over the last 10 years.  However,  intraregional trade may not be the best
measure to evaluate the effectiveness  of  ASEAN/AFTA.  AFTA was intended to reduce
tariffs and thus make the region borderless in order to lower production costs.  In this
sense, AFTA is different from conventional FTA agreements.  ASEAN's intention for
AFTA is explicitly stated as being not to increase intra-ASEAN  trade but rather to make
its products  internationally competitive.  "It is not in the interest of ASEAN countries to
increase their trade with other ASEAN countries at the expense of  third countries.  Their
extra-regional linkages are very valuable."1 9 2 Therefore, if intraregional trade has not
increased since AFTA was initiated, perhaps it cannot be claimed as a failing of AFTA
since that was never its intention.
Recent analysis, however, suggests that ASEAN has also failed in this intention,
i.e., to lower production  costs in order to become more competitive.  A November 2002
interim report of an independent study conducted by McKinsey & Co.' 93 found that
ASEAN is not attractive to investors because it is small, fragmented, and the cost of
doing business there is higher than necessary because of varying product standards and
excessively bureaucratic  customs procedures.  This is particularly true when compared to
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deeper integration and to free up the movement of goods, services, capital and labor
suggesting that this would increase its power in international negotiations.1 9 4
Perhaps the time has come when continuing to guard national sovereignty at the
expense of regional progress is no longer in the best interests of the region or of the
nations therein.  ASEAN  has provided important regional leadership for over 30 years
and has been a core group for APEC.  Its extension to an ASEAN-Plus-Three  (APT)
configuration is seen as a positive move and if the APT group thrives  and develops in line
with the changing needs of the region, it could become a viable regional institution for
East Asia.
APEC
APEC began as a ministerial meeting in  1989 with twelve countries (Australia,
Brunei Darussalam,  Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand,  the
Philippines,  Singapore, Thailand and the United States) attending.  Since then, nine more
countries have joined (China, Hong Kong, Taiwan,  Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Chile,
Peru, Russia and Vietnam) making a total of 21  countries.  As is evident from the list of
members, APEC is a multilateral forum encompassing the Pacific Rim as opposed to just
East Asia.  It is also atypical for a regional institution in that it is informal and loosely
structured, unlike the EU.
The chairmanship of APEC rotates each year to a different country.  All APEC
members submit ideas and proposals to the chair for the agenda for the coming year.
This is seen by many as one of APEC's strengths.  No country can dominate the action
agenda under this process  and the agenda ends up being an amalgam of the best ideas
submitted to the country chairing APEC.
APEC adopted ASEAN's consensus-style  decisionmaking process as its mode of
operation.  The APEC leaders also agreed to alternate the annual meetings between
ASEAN and non-ASEAN countries.  Singapore,  an ASEAN country, was selected for the
ASEAN Secretariat.  All these decisions  elevated the importance of ASEAN in the
APEC forum.
APEC has pioneered another unique feature, "open regionalism".  This means that
the countries adhere to GATT/WTO consistency.  "'Open regional co-operation',  or open
regionalism, under which liberalization is applied without discrimination to non-members
on a multilateral basis a la WTO, is a basic principle of APEC."  195
Trade liberalization, trade facilitation and economic and technical cooperation
(Ecotech), or capacity building, form the three main legs of APEC.  A discussion of  these
follows.
APEC's Trade  Liberalization and Facilitation
In 1994, APEC leaders adopted the Bogor Declaration which commnits members
to achieve free trade and investment by 2010 for developed countries and by 2020 for
developing  countries.  The following year, a guideline for reaching this target, the trade
and investment liberalization and facilitation (TILF), was provided by the Osaka Action
Agenda.  The guideline calls upon APEC members to announce their intentions to reduce
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then review other countries' IAPs and "watch" for implementation.  In 1996, the APEC
process developed  one step further by asking countries to submit their Individual Action
Plans for public viewing.  Countries submitted their first IAPs in 1997,  allowing leaders
and the general public to better evaluate the APEC process.  However, since IAPs are
non-binding commitments  to liberalization by individual economies, a rigorous review is
necessary to see if countries actually implement their plans.  The IAP mechanism  for
implementing  liberalization makes analyses of country commitments a difficult task.
One recent study'96 has developed an in-depth scorecard  for the LAP process.  It
scored 18 out of the 21  APEC countries in  13 areas including tariff and non-tariff
measures,  services, investment standards and conformance, customs procedures,
intellectual property rights, competition policy, government  procurement, deregulation,
rules of origin, dispute mediation and business mobility.  It did not produce rankings  for
the three newest members (Peru, Russia and Vietnam) because of insufficient data.
The results are mixed.  Countries committed themselves to liberalization in
concrete terms only until 2000.  The countries'  commitments are characterized  as
Uruguay Round-plus-alpha ('a').  "However,  'a' turned out to be small in many
economies and areas."1  The Individual Action Plan annual revisions  in 1997  and 1998
were minimal, reflecting  countries' reluctance to commit themselves to more trade
liberalization measures before what was supposed to be the beginning of the next World
Trade Organization (WTO) round in Seattle in 2000.  The findings of this study, as well
those of a study by the PECC Trade Policy Forum, are shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5
STUDY  FINDINGS
Yamazawa/Urata  Average  Single Tariffs:
(2000)  *  Reduced to below 5 percent in three economies.
*  Reduced to 5-10 percent in nine economies.
*  Will be reduced to 10 percent in the near future in three
economies.
*  Tariffs of more than 20 percent remain on sensitive
products  in eight economies with no commitment to their
gradual  reduction.
Non-Tariff Measures:
*  Industrialized members still impose NTMs of more than
20 percent frequency' 98 on several sectors.
*  Some Asian developing members impose NTMs of high
frequency on many sectors.
*  Papua New Guinea removed all NTMs in 1997.
*  The Philippines  and Thailand currently have imposed high
frequency NTMs but reported in their IAPs future plans
that they will remove them.
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Trade Policy Forum,  *  Simple average tariffs for APEC have fallen in the 1995-
PECC'99 98 period but experienced an increase in 1999.  Tariffs
declined from about 11  percent to about 7 percent during
this time.
*  The increase in tariffs in  1999 represents a change in
approach due to Uruguay Round commitments.  Countries
began applying tariffs to agricultural products.  Before this
time, agricultural products were listed under non-tariff
measures.  Therefore,  the increase in tariffs in 1999 is not
seen as an increase in protectionism.
*  High tariffs remain in the following areas:  food,
beverages and tobacco;  agriculture and hunting; textiles;
and fishing sectors.  Peak tariffs are used in areas where a
country does not have a comparative advantage.
*  The standard deviation in tariffs declined from nearly 30
percent to under 10 percent between  1995 and 1999.  The
report states, "lower dispersion imply less distortions and
thus gains in welfare."
Between  1995  ancd 2000, the average tariff rate for APEC members decreased
from 12 percent to 8 percent.200  Figure 3.2 shows a country-by-country  picture of
significant reductions in tariff levels.
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Trends  in East Asian Average Tariff Rates
(as  reported  in APEC Individual Action Plans)
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This figure indicates that East Asian economies have  liberalized trade.  These
tariff reductions, however,  cannot be attributed  solely to the effect of APEC's TILF
program but also derive  from the GATT/WTO framework as well from AFTA's CEPT
process, as previously discussed.20 '
A 1999 APEC Economic Committee study (an update of the original  1997 study)
estimated that APEC's trade liberalization and facilitation measures,  committed to date
(i.e.,  1998), would "expand  the region's annual income (GDP) by US$75 billion (at  1997
prices), or 0.4% of the region's total GDP."202 (This is in addition to annual income
gains  created from the remaining Uruguay Round commitments, which would be 0.7
percent of GDP or $114 billion.)  APEC members  were shown to benefit more than non-
APEC economies, and if dynamic  effects are included,  income gains would be $90-lOS
billion.
The study also estimated greater gains in real income from trade facilitation
measures  than from the trade liberalization measures that were included  in the model.  Of
the estimated 0.4 percent total increase in GDP, 0.25  percent was from trade facilitation
and 0.16 percent from trade liberalization.  Of the aforementioned  $75 billion gain to the
region's annual income from both trade liberalization and  facilitation, $46 billion would
be from facilitation alone.  Trade facilitation refers to trade measures that reduce  trade
costs (except for trade liberalization measures such  as tariff cuts).  These include
activities such as streamlining customs procedures,  aligning domestic  standards with
international  standards in certain sectors, establishing MRAs  (mutual recognition
arrangements)  in the telecommunications  sector, reducing paper document use,
enhancing business mobility through use of a special travel card,  and others.
62On the other hancd,  if real income gains from "full" trade facilitation (i.e., beyond
what is committed to date) are compared to gains from "total" tariff elimination (i.e.,  100
percent tariff reductions  extended by APEC members  to both members and non-
members),  the gains from facilitation would be less than from tariff elimination.
However, the study also emphasizes  that "trade facilitation has a large undeveloped
potential for the improvement of economic efficiency and productivity."203
Non-tariff measures (NTMs) pose a significant problem for trade liberalization.
NTMs for both industrialized and developing countries  are in many cases of more than 20
percent frequency on several sectors and are not considered to be WTO consistent but
rather are for the purpose of protecting domestic producers.  Furthermore, while a few
countries (e.g., the Philippines and Thailand)  have future plans to remove their NTMs,
many countries give no indication that they plan to reduce  them.204
ECOTECH
By most accounts, Economic and Technical Cooperation  (Ecotech) has been the
hardest element of APEC to define and agree upon.  In 1994, Indonesia insisted that
development cooperation should be the "third pillar" of APEC, in addition to trade
liberalization and facilitation measures.205 However, the proposal was very negatively
received as a possible distraction from the liberalization program.  Members could not
agree upon a name, signifying resistance to the idea or signifying a misunderstanding  of
the real intent of the proposal.  The developed countries seemed to see it as a request for
development funds.  The developing countries viewed it as a way of building capacity.
The  1996 Manila Declaration attempted to clarify that Ecotech was not "foreign aid" and
that the effort was intended to take advantage of the expertise, technology, experience,
and information available  in the APEC countries.
In the beginning, E]cotech had other problems as well.  "A typical APEC Ecotech
activity is a pet project proposed and coordinated by a member,  financed mainly by the
sponsor, and partly supported by APEC."206 In an attempt to extricate Ecotech from this
"pet project" syndrome, the Manila Declaration attempted to build in some accountability
by stating that the effort should be goal-oriented  with measurable  criteria.  The following
priority areas were identified.207
1.  develop human capital
2.  develop  stable, safe and efficient capital markets
3.  strengthen economic infrastructure
4.  harness technologies for the future
5.  safeguard the quality of life through environmentally sound growth
6.  develop and strengthen the dynamism of small and medium enterprises
APEC's Significance
APEC has made a substantial contribution to the Asia-Pacific  region's
economy.  One estimate shows that the impact of APEC trade liberalization is
"equivalent to one fourth of the full impact of implementation of the Uruguay Round
(UR) trade liberalization."208 Given the magnitude of the coverage of issues in the
Uruguay Round, not to mention that it took nine years to negotiate, the impact is large.
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ASEAN.  In addition, countries at different stages of development with different factor
endowments combine to produce better growth potential.  As APEC's membership
continued to grow, the loosely configured group began to look more global than
regional.  This has resulted in all the problems associated with being a larger forum
(e.g., difficulty in reaching agreement  and slow decisionmaking.)  APEC contributed to
the unfortunate results of the Seattle  1999 World Trade talks by not being able to agree
on an agenda to bring to the negotiating table.
APEC is credited with fashioning a new model of economic cooperation that
covers a broader array of issues than usual.  Its work agenda includes  improving
competition policy and detailed facilitation issues, as well as other items.  But the
comprehensiveness  of the approach has not been matched by the effectiveness of
results.  Non-binding Investment Principles are weak, competition policies have been
discussed but no guidelines have been drafted, and involvement  in WTO negotiations
has not always been productive.20 9
The APEC International Assessment Network  (APIAN)210 issued its first policy
report on APEC in 2001.  The report acknowledged the many accomplishments that
APEC has made but came up with twelve recommendations  for improvement in the
organization.  Among these twelve, the following are the most concrete
recommendations.21 1
>  IAP commitments should be specific, concrete and measurable to the extent
possible.
>  APEC members should be accountable  for their LAP commitments.
>  The APEC secretariat should be strengthened, including the creation of
longer-term  professional positions and the designation of a Secretary-General
with a multi-year term of office.
>  APEC  should better integrate finance  and development.
>  Academic engagement should be encouraged.
The APIAN report explains, "APEC's particular blend of idealism and realism
has produced a "soft"  or "weak" institution [. . .] that can neither 'bind'  trade agreements
nor authorize punitive actions against members whose trade policies  are inconsistent with
APEC norms.  2  It also reports that APEC lacks the internal capacity to monitor and
evaluate the implementation  of key programs.
In fact, at the end of 2001, APEC ministers came to the same conclusion and
agreed that the LAP peer review process needed to be strengthened in order to increase
"objectivity and transparency".  In furtherance  of this goal, new elements were added to
the process including "the appointment of a formal review team for each peer review
exercise and the commissioning of an expert to conduct independent in-country research
and analysis together with presentation of a written analytical report.", 213 Japan and
Mexico were the first to volunteer for review under this new system and the results for
these two countries were published on the APEC web site in August 2002.  This is
obviously an advancement for the APEC process but it remains to be seen how many
member countries will volunteer to be reviewed in this way given that the results are
made available to the public.
64Concluding  Remarks
Although the development of regional institutions  was not an initial goal of East
Asian integration, most :East Asians would now like to see a strong regional institution in
place to lead the region toward closer cooperation  and deeper integration.  Regional
cooperation has reached the stage in East Asia where more structure and leadership is
needed.  However, most find the current condition of regional institutions in East Asia to
be discouraging.  The ASEAN Secretariat  is viewed as powerless, slow moving and
directionless.  APEC is seen to be weakening  as an economic  forum.  In addition, there
are numerous other fora,, task forces, committees and working groups that are often
referred to as "talk shops" and are attributed with little real accomplishment.  Even with
all the existing institutions to choose from, proposals for new groups continue to emerge.
Two proposals have been made in recent months by Thailand  and Singapore, both of
which are reportedly seeking more zealous economic  integrative  efforts than those so far
provided by currently existing institutions.214
While proposals for new fora are not unusual, the current proliferation of
suggestions  implies dissatisfaction with the region's current institutions.  It is apparent
that the quest for a dynamic, effective regional institution is ongoing.  This may not be
entirely undesirable as E,ast Asia is still at an early stage of regional integration and an
experimental  approach to institution building could have some advantages and may be
preferable  to locking into one forum from the outset and later finding it difficult to
change or dismantle.  Also, it is not a given that several institutions cannot coexist and be
beneficial provided they do not work to the detriment of one another.  However, along
with an increase in the rLumber of broadly similar  institutions comes the risk that the
region's  focus and energy will be diluted or dissipated.  While the new and innovative are
to be encouraged, there needs to be caution that the result is not simply more of the same,
rather than a move closer to a vibrant, effective institution that serves the needs of the
entire region.
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views convergence  as the alignment of members'  economic and monetary policies with convergence
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203 APEC (1999: 20)
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205 Elek and Soesastro  (2000: 220)
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71207  Elek and Soesastro (2000: 222)
208  APEC (1999: 3)
209  Petri (2000: 104)
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1 Feinberg and Ye (2001)
212  Feinberg and Ye (2001: 9)
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